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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem area 
 
The group’s interest in this project was eclectic, reflecting several levels of interest. One 
notion centred around democracy, for example the prospects of democracy in ethnically 
diverse countries (see glossary). In today’s society the heterogeneity of cultures and nation-
states is becoming increasingly recognised, as is the spread of democracy (for better or for 
worse) and the way that these two factors interact is what interested us. Therefore looking at 
Lebanon, a country which is founded on different cultures, would be an apposite topic. 
Closely related to this issue of democracy is the ‘implementation’ of democracy in the Middle 
East and its difficulties, for example recently in Iraq. Therefore some of the group found it of 
interest to look at existing democracies that were already present in the Middle East: 
Lebanon. This was even more tempting as all, bar one of the group, had never heard of 
Lebanon’s system of confessionalism (see glossary), thus representing a challenge to lacuna 
in our knowledge. Lastly, Lebanon allowed us to look at the Middle East without choosing a 
much debated conflict, e.g. the Palestine-Israel conflict or Iraq, and it also allowed the project 
to incorporate elements of political science into the project. 
 
When analysing Lebanon it is important to place the discussion in context and describe what 
level of analysis is being adopted. Confessionalism is purported to be a type of democracy, 
which raises the question: on what scale is democracy being discussed? Is global democracy 
being analysed, or regional democracy or Lebanese democracy? First, the focus of this project 
will not be democracy, but confessionalism. Second, confessionalism will only be discussed 
on the national level- not regional or global. The second element of this project whose scale 
needs to be defined is the constitution. Is a global constitution going to be analysed, or will it 
just be a nation-state’s constitution? Despite the possible existence of global or regional 
constitutions the focus of this project will be on the Lebanese constitution (see glossary) and 
its nature.  
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Confessionalism is a unique political system that exists only in Lebanon. As a system of 
democracy it has been present in Lebanon since the creation of its constitution during the 
French Mandate in 1926 and continues today. Confessionalism is understood as “a system of 
government that proportionally allocates political power among a country's communities—
whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population.” (United States 
Institute for Peace). In other words, it is a form of consensus government. In total there are 17 
different ethnic communities, or sects, many of which represent Lebanon in parliament. 
Confessionalism is a form of consociation democracy, which is often found in countries with 
a variety of different ethnic groups. This may be because it is often used as a “mechanism of 
political stability (...) through which (...) a fragmented political culture was stabilised” (Oxford 
Dictionary of Politics, 2003, p. 117). What distinguishes the term confessionalism from 
consociationalism is that confessionalism is a form of consociationalism, rather than an 
alternative or competing ideal. 
 
The consequences of confessionalism are of interest to the academic community and society 
because there is only one country to practise such a system of democracy. Its rarity means 
there is a paucity of literature on the subject – introductory or respected political texts often 
fail to include or define the term “confessionalism” (Heywood, 2007, McLean & McMillan, 2003). 
Therefore, any study that chooses to examine the impact of confessionalism may shed light on 
a hitherto small research area. Indeed, many of the studies that do mention confessionalism 
often describe it as one factor among many in their analysis of Lebanon today (Haddad, 1985 p 
22-24).Few studies attempt to systematically analyse the impact of confessionalism from the 
perspective of confessionalism itself, as opposed to a more historical analysis. Questions that 
remain unanswered include issues of causality. Can confessionalism be held at all responsible 
for the civil war that raged from 1975 until 1990 (see glossary)? If it can be held accountable, 
is it because confessionalism as a concept is inherently flawed, regardless of context? Or have 
problems arisen out of difficulties faced in implementing the confessionalism as an ideal in 
Lebanon? 
 
Given the limited practise of confessionalism as a democratic construct, its generalisability to 
society in general will be more limited - the conclusions would probably be of most benefit to 
Lebanese society. However, if a detailed analysis of the implications of confessionalism was 
undertaken, the potential strengths and weaknesses may be better understood and thus utilised 
more effectively. That is not to claim that the 1975 civil war may have been averted if the 
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academic community or Lebanon understood confessionalism more accurately – that is both 
simplistic and insulting. The war that broke out was due to a myriad of reasons, many beyond 
the control or influence of confessionalism. However the contribution, if any, of 
confessionalism to Lebanese society and the war deserves to be understood. Only then may 
conclusions about the prospects of confessionalism be drawn. This project is explicitly about 
the construct of confessionalism and not a case study of Lebanon. Lebanon will invariably be 
mentioned repeatedly as it is the only country to practise such a system of government, but 
this will only be to illustrate more tangible consequences of confessionalism and give a more 
concrete basis to the analysis.  
 
Lebanese society comprises of 17 different sects, each varying in political influence and 
representing a different group of people with differing interests. Three of the most prominent 
sects have their roles guaranteed by the National Pact (see glossary): the most powerful, 
president,  is traditionally a Maronite (see glossary) Christian, the second most powerful, the 
prime minister, is traditionally a Sunni Muslim (see glossary) and the third most powerful 
position, the speaker of the house, is traditionally a Shi’a Muslim (see glossary). There are 
other sects, both Muslim and Christian, but the three aforementioned sects, the Christian 
Maronites, the Sunnis and the Shi’as, are the most prevalent in the literature. As the 
constitution and the National Pact dictates that the government is based on the county’s ethnic 
groups, ethnic differences in the societal levels have been reflected in the government’s make-
up (via a census). It is an unfortunate fact that the last census in Lebanon was in 1932, making 
one wonder how their current system of government can claim to be representative of the 
country’s demography. 
 
This is compounded when one takes into account the fact that Lebanon is also a consensus 
democracy. In other words, society’s differences are present within the government and 
divisions between sects are legitimized, politically and then socially. As a result of this 
ossification of ethnic differences, loyalties have arisen. Often, the sects have more loyalty to 
themselves than to the government as a whole, or at the very least maintaining their own 
power within the country (McDowell, 1996, p. 7, Norton, 2007, p. 155). These kinds of internal 
problems have undermined the ability of the consensus-based government to govern 
coherently. This issue will be the focus of chapter 3.2 
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When dealing with the consequences of confessionalism it is important not to fall into the 
simplistic trap of over attributing causality. One source, confessionalism, is unlikely to 
account for any given consequence – many sources are likely to contribute. Instead, it may be 
better to think of confessionalism creating a susceptibility to certain consequences, e.g. civil 
war, than causing civil war. The crucial difference between the two is that a susceptibility to 
something does not mean that it will happen – a further pressure or stressor is needed to 
exploit the susceptibility or weakness, and induce the consequence. Instead of asking: did 
confessionalism cause the civil war, the question then becomes: did confessionalism create 
any weak or susceptible points in Lebanon which were then exploited, thus inducing civil 
war? Therefore, our problem formulation is as follows: 
 
1.2 Problem formulation 
How has confessionalism made the state of Lebanon susceptible to conflicts?  
 
The time scale for the problem formulation is from the creation of the independent state of 
Lebanon, 1943, until the Ta’if Agreement (see glossary), in 1989, which effectively ended the 
civil war. Confessionalism existed before Lebanon became an independent state; it was 
enshrined in the constitution of 1926 (Article 24, 95). However, it was still under the protection 
of the French Mandate until independence, therefore this project focuses on the post-
independence as Lebanon had more responsibility for its political actions. The end point of 
the Ta’if Agreement in 1989 was chosen because it represents a landmark agreement in 
Lebanese history. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
1. What is confessionalism and to which extent is it a democratic system? 
2. How does confessionalism compare to political systems in neighbouring countries? 
3. How has confessionalism fostered sectarian loyalties and domestic political culture in   
 Lebanon? 
4. Why has confessionalism weakened Lebanese sovereignty?  
5. How has confessionalism fared in offering an ethnically diverse country democracy? 
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1.4 Methods & Limitations  
1.4.1 Ethnocentricity 
When writing a project about a political system or a country in different part of the world, 
there is always the danger of an excessive ethnocentricity. We are aware that describing 
Lebanon and its surrounding area as “The Middle East” is Euro-centric, and by some people 
understood as only the Arab (see glossary) world, making the term confusing. However the 
term “Middle East” is not to be understood as including any other values than the 
geographical position of the area seen from a European perspective. 
 
That our project group has been raised in predominantly Western and Christian cultures 
introduces bias. One could argue that this affects our interpretation of Arabic culture. 
However, as described later in this chapter, we have tried to gather our sources from a wide 
variety of authors with different ethnicities, and thereby minimizing the bias as much as 
possible. At the same time it is impossible for us to change our backgrounds, and there is 
therefore only so much we can do to act neutral when trying to analyse a culture that is 
different from our own. 
 
1.4.2 Quantitative and qualitative 
When doing social research a distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is 
traditionally made. It is especially ontological, epistemological and theoretical issues that 
make it possible to distinguish these two types. This project is a result of a mixture of these 
two types, the quantitative and the qualitative. Section 3.2 of the project can be categorised as 
more quantitative whereas the later chapters are more the result of a qualitative approach. 
This distinction will be drawn more closely using the differences between the deductive and 
inductive strategies. 
 
To elaborate this the focus will now be on the theoretical issues where qualitative research is 
related to an inductive strategy and quantitative research is connected with the deductive 
strategy (Bryman, 2004, p. 3-11). Often social science research includes elements of both 
inductive and deductive strategies and the question is rather: what tendencies does the 
research have? (Bryman, 2004, p. 11). Broadly, the deductive strategy involves making 
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predictions, attempting to falsify the hypothesis and attempting to account for one’s findings 
(Olsen & Pedersen, 2006, p. 138). By contrast, the inductive strategy involves observations and 
data gathering, development of theory based on these data and the formulation of general 
rules. Here, theory is generated out of research (Bryman, 2004, p. 540). For the deductive 
approach research is generated out of theory. With these distinctions in mind, this project 
adopts both strategies, depending on which is most appropriate. A more deductive approach 
was used when existing political theory on democracy and type of democracy was used to 
explicitly direct our research and analysis. However, a more inductive approach was used 
when attempting to outline the susceptibility of confessionalism, as political science research 
in the field and secondary sources were used as data but without any explicit political science 
theory, other than our problem formulation, to guide the analysis. Thus, this project includes 
both deductive and inductive tendencies in its research strategy. 
 
1.4.3 Choice of Theory 
In this project it has been chosen to focus on theories of democracy. As the main interest is in 
confessionalism and how it is related to susceptible to conflicts it seemed relevant to choose a 
theoretical angle which concerned political systems and regimes. By doing so an 
understanding of confessionalism would materialise, thereby creating the foundation for 
analysing why confessionalism made Lebanon susceptible to conflicts. As democracy by no 
means is the only existing political system another angle could have been chosen. However 
democracy is often seen as an ideal and few countries would describe themselves as 
undemocratic. Furthermore, democracy is especially in the West seen as the only ideological 
defendable political system. As Robert A. Dahl puts it, “Compared then with its alternatives, 
historical and actual, polyarchy is one of the most extraordinary of all human artifacts.”1 
(Dahl, 1989, p. 223). It is therefore very relevant to choose the democracy angle as this will 
reveal if confessionalism lives up to the ideal of democracy and at the same time give an 
understanding of confessionalism. 
 
Even though confessionalism is a political system it undoubtedly had economic and 
sociological consequences as well as political. However, due to the time constraints of this 
                                               
1
 Robert A. Dahl is an American political theorist. Polyarchy and democracy are correlated and polyarchy can 
here be understood as democracy. A further elaboration of Dahl’s notion of polyarchy will be given in the 
project.  
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project, it was chosen to focus on the political affects. A mixture of the political disciplines 
with either the political or the sociological were considered, however, due to the complexity 
of the effects of confessionalism and the system itself it was felt that a mixture of two 
disciplines would give a somehow superficial picture. Instead, it was chosen to scrutinize the 
nature of the system and subsequently analyse its affects on the Lebanese political culture and 
the international perception of Lebanese sovereignty. These two areas are both closely linked 
to confessionalism and susceptibility to conflicts. As the goal of the project is to highlight in 
which way confessionalism made the Lebanese society susceptible to conflict, political 
culture and Lebanese sovereignty were recognised as the two most relevant and rewarding 
areas to focus on.              
 
1.4.4 Choice of Case 
When looking at our choice of subject it is important to emphasize that we are looking at 
consequences of confessionalism and not at a case study of Lebanon. The reason why 
Lebanon has been used as an example of confessionalism is because it is the only known 
country in the world where the system has been practised. It is not to be confused with the 
term consociationalism, which covers the political system of several other countries, e.g. 
Switzerland. The area that confessionalism exists in the world maps directly onto the nation 
state of Lebanon. Therefore, when looking at confessionalism the nation state analysis is 
adopted. It is also possible to adopt other forms of political analysis different from the nation 
state, for example areas of ethnicity, but as the extent of confessionalism is congruent with the 
nation state of Lebanon we did not. Had the political system of confessionalism covered an 
area that included parts of Syria, then the focus of this report would have been on that whole 
area of confessionalism and not just on the state of Lebanon. 
 
1.4.5 Limitations 
Looking into the sources we have used to gather information for our project, we have 
primarily used books and a few official documents, e.g. the Lebanese Constitution and the 
Ta’if Agreement. Besides the documents, which can be classified as primary sources, most of 
the books seem to be secondary sources. Many of them are written during the 1980s, where 
the civil war in Lebanon was coming to an end or even during the 1990s when it was long 
over. It has been a problem finding sources written closer to the events we are discussing in 
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the report. It is likely that a civil war does not encourage the population in a country to write 
books until the tensions are over. However, first hand observations- such as diaries or 
journalism from the years discussed- would have been useful, as well as statistical data from 
that era, but complicated to find. It can be discussed whether most of our sources are 
secondary has affected the quality of our project. It is hard to judge whether or not the authors 
have changed their view on the acts described, between the time of the actual happening and 
the time when writing their books.  
 
Another debatable fact when looking at our sources is the ethnicity of the authors. It could 
seem that some authors have a tendency to be slightly biased according to their own religion 
or nationality when describing the system in Lebanon or certain events. So, we have tried to 
gather our information from a varied group of authors, with different ethnicities, in order to 
make our project as little biased as possible. We have considered checking up on the actual 
backgrounds of the different authors, in order to get a clearer picture of their possible bias, but 
this has proven more complicated to move beyond cursory summaries than expected, and we 
have therefore not done so in this project.  
  
2. Theoretical Ideas and Concepts 
 
In this project, the theoretical focus will be on the ideas and concepts of democracy. The two 
main theorists are the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart and the American political 
scientist Robert A. Dahl. They have been chosen because of the relevance their theories have 
in relation to Lebanon and especially confessionalism as a political system. In order to 
understand confessionalism better as a construct it will be examined to determine if it is a 
democracy and if so, what type. Firstly, Dahl’s concept of polyarchy will be introduced and 
then Lijphart’s distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies will be 
elaborated. 
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2.1 Robert A. Dahl’s Notion of Polyarchy 
The concept of polyarchy was first introduced by Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindbloom 
in the book “Politics, Economics and Welfare.” Since the concept has been developed and 
elaborated in numerous books by Dahl. The term polyarchy means “rule by many”, but can be 
understood and applied in many different ways. In Heywood (2007, p. 32), Western polyarchy 
is seen as one of five types of regimes found in the world today. A political regime is different 
from a political system, in the sense that it includes political as well as economic and cultural 
features. In his 1989 book “Democracy and Its Critics”, Dahl explains polyarchy in the 
following way, “Polyarchy is a political order distinguished at the most general level by two 
broad characteristics: Citizenship is extended to a relatively high proportion of adults, and 
the rights of citizenship include the opportunity to oppose and vote out the highest officials in 
the government.” (Dahl, 1989, p. 220). Thus, polyarchy is described here by Dahl, as a political 
order that can be distinguished from other orders that do not live up to his two broad 
characteristics. Dahl chooses to describe polyarchy as a political order instead of classifying it 
as a system or a regime. If Dahl’s notion of a political order was to be classified in accordance 
with the system and regime typology used in Heywood, it would be a regime as Dahl’s 
description of polyarchy includes civil rights and more cultural aspects. 
 
However, Dahl does elaborate these two very broad characteristics into seven institutions 
which must all be present if a country is to be classified as a polyarchy. These seven are; 
elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for office, freedom of 
expression, alternative information and associational autonomy. It is not enough that these 
institutions and rights are included in a country’s constitution or other national laws, they 
must be implemented and in effect in the given country. The seven institutions are necessary 
in order to secure the following five criteria; voting equality, effective participation, 
enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion. These five criteria, which are 
secured by the institutions, are all essential and fundamental aspects of modern democracies. 
Therefore, the seven institutions in a polyarchy play the central role of enabling democracy. 
In Dahl’s own words, “To put the matter in a slightly different way, all the institutions of 
polyarchy are necessary to the highest feasible attainment of the democratic process in the 
government of a country” (1989, p. 222). Hence, polyarchy creates the necessary conditions for 
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democracy in modern societies and the relationship between the two is therefore of symbiotic 
character. Polyarchy, as defined by Dahl, is therefore both a political order that varies from 
other political orders but more importantly it is a political order that makes democracy 
possible in modern societies (1989, p. 221-222). 
 
The development of polyarchy took place due to what Dahl calls the second transformation of 
democracy. Originally, democracy developed first in the Greek city-states in the 5th century 
BC, and democracies until the 17th century had this city-state character. However, in the 17th 
century the nation state emerged, and this was also the beginning of the second transformation 
of democracy. This second transformation from city state to nation state democracy was 
strengthened in the 19th century where some nations’ democracies already took shape of 
modern contemporary democracies. This could however only happen because the nations 
slowly developed the seven institutions of polyarchy as well. The transformation from city-
state to nation state democracy resulted in dramatic changes the most important of them being 
an expansion of individual rights, larger pluralism and diversity and a change from direct to 
representative democracy. The fundamentals of democracy had changed and to ensure the 
new aspects, polyarchy was necessary. Dahl does however not see polyarchy as the perfect 
embodiment of democracy, instead he sees it as the most democratic political order possible 
in contemporary society. Further developments of democracy are possible and desirable and 
could be realised through a possible further transformation of democracy (Dahl, 1989, p. 213-
219).   
 
Even though a growing number of countries developed into polyarchies and democracies in 
the 20th century, the majority of countries are still considered non-polyarchial by Dahl. Their 
leaders often argue that they either are democratic or are in a democratic transition, but when 
you further analyse them they in no way live up to the standards of democracy and polyarchy. 
A conclusion from this can be that democracy often is misused and can be very hard to 
practise in reality. Dahl acknowledges this and he has therefore recognised five preconditions 
that increase the feasibility for polyarchy in a country. These criteria can be used in order to 
understand why certain countries develop polyarchy and also explain why other countries 
cannot. 
 
The first precondition is control of military and police. These have the means to exercise 
physical coercion and this threat to democracy has to be neutralized in order to develop or 
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sustain polyarchy. A way to realise this is by placing the military and police under civil 
control, this civil control must however also be a part of the democratic process and thereby 
accountable to the public. Dispersing military and policy can also be used to weaken the 
threat they represent (Dahl, 1989, p. 244-251).   
 
The second precondition concerns the nature of a society. Dahl conclusion is that countries 
with modern dynamic pluralist societies (MDP) are more likely to be polyarchies than other 
types of societies. Deciding features of MDPs are high level of income, long-run growth, high 
level of urbanization, occupational diversity, high general educational level and diversity and 
small decreasing agricultural population. Additionally, the economy of the country is mainly 
made up by autonomous firms both competing on national and international level. These 
countries have high levels of well being indicators such as life expectancy and infant 
mortality. Power is in these countries decentralised and spread out between numerous 
relatively independent actors. Consistent economic growth encourages democratic ideas as it 
becomes a common notion that co-operation and bargaining often results in mutual benefits 
(Dahl, 1989, p. 251-254).  
 
The third precondition takes in account the cultural diversity of a country. Countries with 
cultural homogenous populations have a greater chance of being successive polyarchies. 
Heterogeneous countries with many different subcultures can experience serious problems, as 
these subcultures can have their own agendas and therefore fight each other for political and 
financial power. In a worst case scenario this could result in civil war. However, if these 
subcultures co-operate and do not feel threatened by each other polyarchy is still possible. A 
way to ensure co-operation and peace in ethnical diverse countries is by introducing 
consociationalism2. This type of democracy distributes power to the different groups and 
makes sure all groups are represented proportional. It is based on co-operation and consensus 
but at the same time it gives each group some autonomy. In such systems it is essential that 
the political leaders of all groups believe in the system and that all other conditions for 
polyarchy are present (Dahl, 1989, p. 254-260).  
 
The fourth precondition is the political culture and the strength of the belief in democracy. 
Countries with a common strong belief in democracy have stronger more stable polyarchies 
                                               
2
  Consociationalism is elaborated under definition of “Confessionalism”  
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than in countries without. It is still possible to have polyarchy and democracy, but it will be 
more unstable and will easier experience democratic setbacks. The attitude and belief of 
political leaders and activist in democracy is especially important, as they have huge influence 
on the development of a country towards or away from democracy (Dahl, 1989, p. 260-263).  
 
The final precondition can both have a positive and negative effect on a countries 
development or continuity of polyarchy. The influence or direct military control of an external 
power can have various effects on a country depending on the intervening country. If this 
country is a strong democracy itself it can strengthen and encourage democracy. However, if 
the country is more totalitarian or in someway undemocratic it can have a negative effect and 
hinder the democracy of the invaded country from functioning. Even though these distinctions 
seem quite obvious, reality can however be very different. An example of this is Chile, where 
the dictatorship of Pinochet became a reality with the help from the US. In this case, 
democracy was abolished partly because of the interventions of a democratic country and it is 
therefore not always positive for democracy when a strong democracy intervenes in internal 
affairs. Countries with strong stable democracies do not always act in accordance with 
democratic principles and certain countries have throughout history had a tendency to be 
more concerned about self-interests than spreading democratic principles and ideas (Dahl, 1989, 
p. 263-264).  
 
To sum up, polyarchy can be described as a political order that is different from other political 
orders and at same time enables democracy in modern societies. Although polyarchy and 
democracy are highly sought for institutions, relatively few countries live up to the demands, 
and this can often be explained by the lack of one or more of the preconditions existing in 
most polyarchies. Further on in chapter 3.1.2, Lebanon will be analysed according to Dahl’s 
theory of polyarchy. 
 
One of the reasons why Dahl’s theory of polyarchy is seminal and applied in this project is 
because it makes the defining of countries as democratic or undemocratic possible. This 
defining and measurement of democracy is an intensively discussed issue, but one of the most 
commonly accepted ways of doing is Dahl’s. Heywood (2007, p. 33) and Lijphart3 (1999, p. 48) 
                                               
3
  In Lijphart (1999, P. 48), Dahl’s eight institutions are mentioned. This distinction between these eight 
institution and the seven mentioned in this project is however due to the development of Dahl’s theory and are 
therefore fundamentally identical. In other words it is the same theory and the same institutions.   
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are two of the examples where Dahl’s seven institutions and subsequent criteria are applied in 
the analysis of political regimes and democracies.                           
 
2.2 Lijphart’s distinction between majoritarian and consensus 
democracies 
The Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart has like Dahl created numerous seminal theories 
of democracy. The one that will be used in this project concerns the distinction between the 
Westminster and consensus model of democracy. Both types live up to Dahl’s criteria and are 
therefore polyarchies as well as democracies, but the two types are still fundamentally 
different. The Westminster model is a majoritarian4 type of democracy and Lijphart argues 
that this model represents the common notion of democracy. Majoritarian democracy is 
government by the majority and in accordance with their interests. Lijphart is by no means a 
devoted supporter of this type of democracy as it from his viewpoint is somehow 
undemocratic in its nature. In some cases it is only government by the plurality and even 
though the government represents the majority of a population, there will always be an 
extensive minority. Therefore, Lijphart tries to shed light on the other model of democracy, 
the consensus model, which in his eyes is more democratic. This model of democracy is 
based on compromise and collaboration and tries to reduce the minority by maximizing the 
majority. At the same time, it tries to limit the power of the individual societal groups thereby 
securing that power is more equally divided and dominance is kept at a minimum. Therefore, 
Lijphart argues that consensus democracy is the only viable option for a culturally diverse 
country, and imposing a Majoritarian democracy could be dangerous (Lijphart, 1999, p. 1-3, 301-
302).        
 
To distinguish to which extent a country is a majoritarian or consensus based democracy, 
Lijphart has determined ten major differences on two dimensions. The two dimensions are the 
executives-parties5 dimension and the federal-unitary dimension. These ten differences will 
                                               
4
 The Westminster model of democracy will from now on be referred to as the majoritarian model of democracy. 
Lijphart uses both terms interchangeably.  
5
 Lijphart acknowledges himself that these two dimension, the executives-parties and federal-unitary can seem 
somehow arbitrary. Another way he tries to explain them is by labelling them the joint-power dimension and the 
divided-power dimension. As he however chooses to stick with the two first mentioned, these are the ones which 
will be used in this project.   
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now be elaborated, the five first being on the executives-parties dimension and the latter being 
on federal-unitary dimension. 
 
The first major difference is in the concentration of executive power. In majoritarian 
democracies this power is concentrated in single-party cabinets whereas consensus 
democracies are characterised by a share of executive power in multiparty government 
coalitions. Three main types of cabinets can be classified: undersized cabinets, minimal 
winning cabinets and oversized cabinets. Undersized cabinets exist in countries where the 
government consists of one or more parties that fail to represent a parliamentary majority, 
minimal winning cabinets are made up by the lowest number of parties needed to create a 
majority and oversized cabinets include more parties than necessary to create a majority. 
When looking at presidential systems instead of parliamentary systems it is more difficult to 
distinguish and the executive branch is by nature more majoritarian in presidential systems. 
This is due to the fact that the President does not need support from a legislative majority and 
at the same time cabinets are by definition one party cabinets. However, presidential systems 
can be more consensus based if the President chooses to include members from other parties 
in his cabinet and if the President seeks to get oversized support for his legislative proposals 
(Lijphart, 1999, p. 90-105).  
 
The second difference is the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. In 
majoritarian democracies the executive is dominant whereas there is a more equal division of 
power between the two in the consensus democracy. As already mentioned, most democracies 
do either have a parliamentary or presidential system, and one of the main differences is that 
in a presidential system the leader, the President, is popularly elected whereas the leader in a 
parliamentary system is chosen by the legislators. Also, in a parliamentary system the cabinet 
can be dismissed by a vote of no confidence whereas this is normally not possible in a 
presidential system. It is very difficult to outline which system encourages most power 
sharing between the executives and legislators. However, there is a slight tendency that the 
legislative and executive branch in presidential systems share the power more equally. An 
explanation can be that the power is clearly separated in presidential systems. A second 
tendency is that countries where the executive power is traditionally placed in single party 
minimum winning cabinets have executive power dominance. This is partly because the 
minimum winning one party cabinet is the type of cabinet with the longest average life span, 
and therefore have a better change of establishing themselves compared to cabinets that only 
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exists for a few years. However, it is important to remember that these are only tendencies 
and reality can vary a lot from country to country (Lijphart, 1999, p. 116-125, 134-139).  
 
The third difference focuses on the various party systems. The two-party system is considered 
to be a feature of majoritarian democracy while consensus democracies are characterised by 
multi-party systems. Two-party systems often include more than two parties, however it is in 
reality only two parties that compete for government power, and therefore do these two 
parties also receive a clear majority of the votes and seats in parliament. Other parties only 
play a small role and can only be included in the cabinet if they get a seat offered by the 
ruling party. Clear examples of two-party systems are the USA and UK where respectively 
the Republicans and Democrats and the Conservatives and Labour are the two parties. Multi-
party-systems consist of more than two parties and examples of countries with this system are 
Denmark, Italy and Switzerland (Heywood, 2007, p. 284-285, Lijphart, 1999, p. 62-65).  
 
The fourth difference on the executive-parties dimension is the distinction between 
disproportional and proportional electoral systems. Majoritarian democracies use the 
disproportional electoral system while consensus democracies tend to use the proportional 
system where the relationship between votes on a party and seats in the parliament gained by 
the party is somehow proportional. In other words, if a party receives 30% of all votes it 
should subsequently fill approximately 30% of the seats in the parliament, if the countries has 
a proportional electoral system. In countries with disproportional electoral systems this 
relationship would seldom be correlated. There are many different disproportional as well as 
proportional electoral systems. One of the most famous disproportional systems is the “first 
past post” (SMP) system that is in effect in the UK and the USA. Basically the countries are 
divided into constituencies and the candidate with the plurality of votes wins the seat in the 
parliament or congress. Disproportional electoral systems favour two-party systems as 
candidates from smaller parties often will loose in their constituency to candidates from 
bigger parties, resulting in smaller parties receive a percentages of seats in the parliament that 
is smaller than the percentages of votes they have received. Conversely, proportional systems 
favour multiparty systems and coalitions as one party rarely gets the majority of votes 
(Heywood, 2007, p. 256-257, Lijphart, 1999, p. 143-153). 
 
The last difference on the executive-parties dimension concerns the nature of the country’s 
interest group system. Interest group systems in majoritarian democracies are pluralistic 
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whereas they are based on corporatism in consensus democracies. Corporatism is to be 
understood in a non-authoritarian way characterised by national, specialised peak 
organisations and incorporation of interest groups in the political process. Countries with 
corporatism will therefore have few relative large interest groups that are part of national peak 
organisations. Leaders of peak groups will have ongoing internal cooperation as well as 
consultations with the government that can result in comprehensive tripartite pacts. 
Conversely, pluralistic systems found in majoritarian democracies have many interest groups 
and the system is uncoordinated and based on competition. Tripartite cooperation and 
agreements are rare and peak organisations are weak if at all existing (Lijphart, 1999, p. 171-173).  
 
The first difference on the federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart’s second dimension) is the 
distinction between federal decentralized governments and unitary centralized government. 
The first is present in consensus democracies while the latter is a part of majoritarian 
democracies. Federalism splits political authority in a country into at least two levels, a centre 
and a sub-level. The USA is a clear example of federalism and here you have the sub-units of 
the various states. The subunits enjoy some autonomy, however important areas such as 
defence policies and foreign policies are often completely under the control of the centre. 
Power in some areas is hereby decentralised and distributed out to different subunits. In 
Majoritarian democracies power is not decentralised but instead embedded in the national 
government, which thereby to some extent posses power over all regions of the country. 
(Lijphart, 1999, p. 185-188, 195, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.) 
 
The second difference is highly interrelated with the first as it focuses on the division of 
legislative power. The two main options for countries are here unicameralism and 
bicameralism. Bicameralism is a trait of consensus democracies and is a part of all federal 
systems. Non-federal systems often have unicameralism but can also have bicameralism. 
There are many different variations of bicameralism, and they differ in the relation between 
the two chambers. Weak bicameralism can be found in a country such as the UK where the 
division of power between the House of Lords and House of Commons is very unequal. On 
the other hand, strong bicameralism is found in countries such as the USA and Switzerland 
were power is somehow equally shared between the two legislative chambers (Lijphart, 1999, p. 
200-205).     
 
International Social Science Basic Studies  by Group 1 in House 21.2 
1st semester  Autumn 2007 
Page 19 of 61 
Lijphart’s third and fourth, which are the rigidity of the constitution and the frequency of 
judicial review, will be explained together as they both examine the constitution of a country. 
The third looks specifically into the flexibility of the constitution and what is necessary in 
order to amend the constitution. Lijphart acknowledges the following four majorities 
necessary to change the constitution: super-majorities greater than two-thirds, two-thirds 
majorities, between two-thirds and ordinary majorities and finally ordinary majorities. Rigid 
constitutions difficult to amend are often found in consensus democracies whereas a flexible 
constitution is a characteristic of a majoritarian democracy. The fourth difference also focuses 
on a country’s constitution, as it judges the frequency of judicial review. Judicial review 
becomes relevant when a law is maybe in violation with the constitution. If a country has 
judicial review it is up to the court or a special council to decide if the law is in conflict with 
the constitution. The crucial part is that it is someone independent of the legislative branch 
that makes this decision. Strong and frequent judicial review is most apparent in consensus 
democracies while the lack of judicial review or at least very weak and infrequent is a feature 
of majoritarian democracy. If no judicial review is present in a country it is entirely up to the 
parliament or the majority of the parliament to judge if the law they are passing is in order 
with the constitution (Lijphart, 1999, p. 216-225).  
 
The last difference on the federal-unitary dimension is the status of the central bank. More 
specifically, what is of interest is the level of independence the central bank enjoys. The 
appointment and tenure of the bank’s governor, policy formulation, central bank objectives 
and limitations on lending are here the four variables looked at. Consensus democracies will 
normally have independent central banks. The highest possible level of independence can be 
secured by having governor’s that are in office for more than eight years and have no 
relationship with or dependence on the government. At the same time, central banks must 
exclusively form the monetary policy and have price stability as their main objective in order 
to reach the highest level of independence. The bank must only lend to the central bank and 
be in complete control of the conditions connected with the loan. In Majoritarian democracies 
the central bank enjoys noticeable less independence and is on the contrary very close 
connected with the executive branch and its objectives are often in conflict with each other 
(Lijphart, 1999, p. 232-237).   
 
The ten main differences between majoritarian and consensus democracies have now been 
outlined, however it must be stressed that in reality no democracies live up to either all the 
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majoritarian features or the consensus characteristics. In other words, a country can be 
characterised as a majoritarian democracy even though it in some areas is closer to being a 
consensus democracy. This is of course the same the other way round with a consensus 
democracy. Still, most democracies are either predominantly majoritarian or consensus based, 
and most of the differences on the two dimensions are closely connected and one therefore 
often comes with the other. Therefore, Lijphart’s theory of consensus vs. majoritarian 
democracy enables the classification of democratic systems. Additionally, it provides the 
foundation for a more thorough understanding of a country’s political system and distribution 
of political power between the executive, legislative and judicial branch. 
 
3. Main Analysis  
3.1 Confessionalism as a political system 
 
3.1.1 The recent history of Lebanon 
Before considering what kind of system confessionalism is, a brief history to the country of 
Lebanon and the introduction of confessionalism will be outlined. Then the Lebanese 
constitution and confessionalist system will be analysed according to Dahl and Lijphart’s 
theory outlined previously. Before 1920 Lebanon was only the mountain range of the country 
it is today. It was not a country of its own, but a small part of the Ottoman Empire that was 
ruled by a Sultan in Turkey. The main religion of the Ottoman Empire was Sunni Islam, but 
on Mount Lebanon, Druze (see glossary) and Maronite communities lived in a relatively 
peaceful coexistence. Like some other mountain areas in the Empire, they enjoyed relative 
independence under a feudal system, presided over by the prince of the mountain, while still 
paying formally recognition to the Ottoman Sultan (McDowall, 1996, p. 9). 
 
Foreign interventions in the area in the mid-19th century resulted in a collapse of the feudal 
system, and the mountain area was split up in two, each under the supervision of Ottoman 
officials that were Sunni and Christian respectively. They were not able to maintain political 
stability, in the way their predecessors had done. By 1860, the class and sectarian tensions 
brought about widespread massacres of the Christians throughout the Druze parts of the 
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mountain. Later that year French troops invaded Beirut to safeguard the Christians and when 
the Ottoman Empire collapsed by the end of World War One in 1918, Lebanon (and Syria) 
was fully occupied by France (McDowall, 1996, p. 10). 
 
In 1920, France created Greater Lebanon; that included Mount Lebanon as well as the former 
Syrian areas of Tripoli and Akkar to the north, the Biqa Valley to the east and Sidon and Tyre 
in the south. The inclusion of these areas also meant the inclusion of several new confessions 
to the country, e.g. Greek Orthodox, and Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. In 1926, the first 
constitution was made, based on confessional principles, formally sharing the political powers 
between the now several different religions in the country. The Maronites, who had a special 
support from the French because of their ties with Europe and Christianity, wielded more 
influence in Lebanon (McDowall, 1996, p. 10). Throughout the first half of the 20th century a 
growing Muslim part of the country felt neglected and wished for a greater share of the 
political power in the country.  
 
In 1943, Lebanon gained its independence from France and the newly elected government 
created the first official National Pact. As a result of this the seats in Parliament were now 
more equally divided between the different sects proportional to the last census made in 1932. 
This division of power is often spoken about as the 6:5 ratio, being Christians and Muslims 
respectively. The National Pact also reserved governmental positions for the three largest 
confessions of the country: The presidency to a Maronite, the premiership to a Sunni, and the 
speaker of the Chamber of Deputies to a Shi’a Muslim. In the following decades the 
population grew rapidly, especially in the Muslim areas. This changed the demographic 
reality in Lebanon and thereby rendered the current division of seats in parliament untenable 
(McDowall, 1996, p. 11-12). 
 
In 1948, Israel declared its independence, and subsequently Lebanon joined the rest of the 
Arab-League in an armed fight against Israel, showing their disapproval of the new Israeli 
state. This war displaced a large number of Palestinians who subsequently sought refuge in 
surrounding countries, especially in Lebanon. During the Arab-Israeli conflicts in the 
following decades even larger numbers of Palestinians fled into neighbouring Lebanon, which 
was one of the only states in the area willing to accept their presence. The number of 
Palestinians settled in Lebanon grew from 40,000 after the 1948 war to approximately 
400,000 in 1975 (Jabbra & Jabbra 2001, p. 80, McDowall, 1996, p 14). 
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The period after independence in 1943 was, with the exception of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, 
relatively peaceful for Lebanon. The increasing economic growth gave Lebanon the nickname 
of the Switzerland of the Middle East. Large national companies invested heavily in the 
country, banks settled in Beirut and it became a popular destination for tourists.  
 
However, in the late 1960s the prosperity of Lebanon declined and it now became a country 
plagued with increasingly high unemployment rates and a general dissatisfaction with the 
confessional system. On top of this, tensions between the sectarian groups had increased, 
especially fuelled by the uprising of PLO that was partly facilitated by the Cairo Agreement  
(see glossary) of 1969 which permitted the presence of PLO in Lebanon. The Lebanese 
society did not have the strength or coherence to solve the rapidly increasing strains and it all 
ended in the civil war which began on the 13th of April 1975. The Syrian military intervention 
in June 1976 and the Israeli military invasions in 1978 and then 1982 only had the effect of 
intensifying the conflict and creating further turmoil. During the war, alliances shifted rapidly 
and unpredictably. By the end of it, nearly every party had allied with and subsequently 
betrayed every other party at least once (Haddad, 1985, 41-44, McDowall, 1996, p. 14-15). 
 
The conflict continued into the 1980s, where war crimes of brutality were seen regularly, and 
Beirut and other cities were left in ruins. The fighting also scared away international investors 
in the country, creating devastating effects on the Lebanese economy, illustrated by a further 
increase in unemployment and inflation rates.  
 
By 1989, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and including Saudi 
Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, began to formulate solutions to the conflict. After a twenty-
three day long marathon negotiation in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, they proclaimed a new 
constitutional agreement named Document of National Understanding, also called Ta’if 
Agreement. The agreement restructured the National Pact’s political system in Lebanon by 
transferring some of the power away from the Maronite Christian community and thereby 
politically accommodate the demographic shift to a Muslim majority (Ziadeh, 2006, pp. 140-142). 
The agreement also provided for the disarmament of all militias and thereby the basis for the 
ending of the civil war and the return to political stability. 
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This was a brief introduction to Lebanese history. Central aspects and events from 
independence in 1943 to the Ta’if agreements from 1989 will be elaborated throughout the 
project and in the concluding part an answer of the problem formulation will be given. The 
conclusion will also attempt to explain, with respect to confessionalism, why a society that 
seemed well-functioning broke down resulting in years of fighting and disintegration. The 
focus in the project is on the political system, confessionalism, in Lebanon and the focus will 
therefore be on issues and developments closely related to confessionalism.    
 
3.1.2 The Lebanese Constitution and Political System 
Before looking at specific developments after the introduction of confessionalism, an analysis 
of confessionalism as a political system is necessary. In order to do so, the Lebanese 
constitution will be analyzed based on Robert A. Dahl’s seven institutions of polyarchy and 
Arend Lijphart’s ten differences between majoritarian and consensus based systems6. This 
will give an in-depth picture of the political system in Lebanon and at the same time it will 
reveal to which extent Lebanon and confessionalism is to be regarded democratic. However, 
it is crucial to keep in mind that just because a constitution secures polyarchy and democracy 
these are not necessary implemented in reality. The resulting conclusion of the analysis of the 
constitution can therefore be seen as the ideal of the confessional system.   
 
The Lebanese constitution was adopted on the 23rd of May 1926 and introduced 
confessionalism in Lebanon. Several amendments have since been made and particular 
clauses have been abolished. As the project analyses confessionalism’s impact on certain 
areas of the Lebanese society from independence in 1943 to the Ta’if agreement in 1989 the 
version which will be analysed is the version that was used between 1947 and 1990. There 
were no amendments made in this period, however, as the analyses also tries to highlight 
central features of confessionalism the 1990 version of the constitution will be used if it is 
relevant. In such case, the reader will be notified that the amendments referred to are from 
1990 (Lebanese Constitution, Arab Law Quarterly, 1997) 
 
                                               
6
 These two theorists and their theories have been introduced and elaborated in the chapter on theoretical 
concepts and ideas. 
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The Lebanese constitution will now be scrutinized according to Dahl’s seven institutions of 
polyarchy in order to judge to which extent Lebanon and confessionalism is to be 
characterised democratic.  
 
The first of Dahl’s seven institutions, a true fundamental in all democracies, elected officials, 
is secured by the 24th article which states that “The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed 
of elected members;…” The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative body in Lebanon. In 
extension of Dahl’s first institutions, the right to run for office is the second institution and 
this is secured by Article 12 which says “Every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public 
office; no preference shall be made except on the basis of merit and competence, according to 
the conditions established by law.”  
 
The two next institutions which will be examined are freedom of speech and associational 
autonomy. Both these institutions are also present in the Lebanese constitution, more 
specifically in Article 13. This article states that “The freedom to express one's opinion orally 
or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of 
association are guaranteed within the limits established by law.”  
 
The fifth of Dahl’s institutions, inclusive suffrage, is the last of the seven clearly embedded in 
the constitution. Article 21 declares “Every Lebanese citizen aged 21 or more is an elector 
provided he fulfils the conditions stated by the electoral law.” However, two things are to be 
noticed here. The first is the age of 21, which can be argued is quite high, but what is most 
important is the reference to the electoral law. The crucial part of the electoral law and what is 
interesting in relation to democracy is the part of the law that distinguishes between men and 
women. All males are obliged to vote whereas females have the option to vote if they have 
elementary education. This is undoubtedly against Dahl’s idea of inclusiveness and 
democracy (Central Intelligence Agency)    
 
The last two of Dahl’s seven institutions are hard to judge from the constitution. The first one, 
alternative information, can however be partly judged. The constitution does not specifically 
refer to the existence of alternative information, but as both freedom of speech and freedom of 
association are guaranteed, the fundament for alternative information is definitely present. 
Other articles that make the presence of alternative information possible are Article 9 and 39. 
Article 9 guarantees freedom of conscience and religion while Article 39 protects the 
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members of the Chamber of Deputies so they cannot be prosecuted on the basis of their 
opinions or the votes they cast. The last of Dahl’s institutions, free and fair elections, is very 
hard to judge. The constitution does not specifically address that the elections have to be free 
and fair. However, free and fair elections would be in line with the rest of the constitution as 
political and civil rights are secured and immunity to members of the Chamber is guaranteed.  
 
Therefore, the conclusion of the analysis is that the Lebanese constitution, which is a 
fundamental part of the confessional political system in Lebanon, to a large extent lives up to 
the seven institutions of polyarchy. Thus, confessionalism as a political system is a system 
based on democratic principles. The weakest part of the constitution is the one which 
concerns suffrage. The electoral laws of Lebanon which are referred to in the constitution do 
not secure universal suffrage. In order to have this, a distinction between males and females 
must not be made. However, as these restrictions are not stated in the constitution but in other 
national laws it can be argued that they have less to do with the nature of confessionalism and 
more to do with other factors.     
 
It is also important to remember that constitutions and reality can be to very different things. 
This essential issue will be discussed further in this project. For now, the important 
conclusion is that the confessional system introduced in Lebanon with the 1926 conclusion to 
a large extent included the seven institutions of polyarchy which according to Dahl enables 
democracy.  
 
As the Lebanese constitution encourages democracy it is now necessary to distinguish which 
type of democracy, majoritarian or consensus. This will be done in accordance with Arend 
Lijphart’s ten differences between majoritarian and consensus democracy. This will also 
facilitate the characterisation of confessionalism as a system based on either majoritarian or 
consensus based principles.   
 
The first of Lijphart’s difference, the concentration of executive power, can be difficult to 
determine from a constitution. The executive power is according to the Lebanese constitution 
vested in the President who is supposed to act in accordance with the Council of Ministers. 
The Council of Ministers, which is the cabinet, is created by the President. The President is 
elected by the parliament with at least a two-thirds majority and all ministers including the 
Prime Minister are then chosen by the President. Like confessionalism this creation of the 
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executive branch of government is quite unique. Lijphart’s distinction between minimum 
winning, undersized and oversized cabinets cannot directly be applied, as Article 95 stipulates 
that, “As a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall be 
equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Ministry, provided 
such measures will not harm the general welfare of the state.”. Therefore, the President cannot 
freely choose the cabinet he wants, he has to do in accordance with proportional 
representation of the sects. This proportionality was introduced in electoral laws in 1926 and 
with the 1943 National Pact. However, it is still possible to characterise the concentration of 
executive power. The Lebanese creation of cabinet is clearly based on compromise and 
consensus, as the President has to choose ministers from all relatively large sects and not only 
his own. The nature of the concentration of executive power is therefore more consensus 
based than majoritarian (Articles 49 & 53, Picard, 2002, p. 52, 70).   
 
The second difference is the power share between the legislative and executive body. The 
Lebanese system is probably best characterised as a parliamentary system. The head of 
government is the Prime Minister who has been chosen by the President and all ministers can 
receive a vote of no-confidence from the parliament. The President is also somehow 
accountable to the legislative Chamber of Deputies as they elect him and choose if they want 
to re-elect him. The executive branch is therefore accountable to the legislative. However, it is 
noticeable that the President, which is the head of the state, possesses considerable more 
power than the Prime Minister. The role and the powers of the Prime Minister are very 
ambiguous, and additionally the President chooses all the ministers. When trying to judge the 
balance of power in the system two of the important aspects are the confessional nature of the 
system and the manner in which the cabinet is created. As the cabinet creation is based on 
consensus and compromise, a share of power between the executive and legislative body is 
most likely (Articles 37, 53 and 64). 
 
The third difference is the difference between two-party systems and multi-party systems. A 
constitution does not dictate this. However, the confessional nature of the Lebanese 
constitution makes a multi-party system most likely. Article 24 of the constitution states that 
“The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed of elected members; their number and the 
method of their election shall be determined by the electoral laws in effect”. Electoral laws of 
1926 dictated that seats in parliament were to be proportionally shared and this principle was 
reconfirmed in the 1943 National Pact. Therefore, as Lebanon is a country divided in several 
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confessional sects, a two-party system is highly unlikely. The Lebanese party-system is 
therefore also consensus based. 
 
The fourth of Lijphart’s ten differences is very interesting to discuss in relation to the 
confessional system. This is the distinction between proportional and disproportional electoral 
systems. The entire confessional system is built on proportional representation, however it is 
not proportionality understood in the sense of proportional representation in accordance with 
percentage of votes. Instead, as Article 95, which was quoted in the previous paragraph, 
Article 24 and electoral laws explain seats in parliament and ministries are split between 
sectarian groups in proportion with their size. Thus, every confessional group is represented 
in accordance with its size. Even though, this type of proportionality based on confession is 
very different from the traditional electoral proportionality it is obvious that the ideas behind 
the system are based on consensus.  
 
The last difference on the party-executive dimension concerns the interest group system. 
Although, this is an aspect of society not included in constitutions a few remarks will be 
made. Due to the strong sectarian loyalties of the Lebanese people, their interests are typically 
promoted by the politicians elected for the sect.  This is very different from heterogeneous 
Western countries where to a larger extent labour unions and other interest groups take care of 
the individual’s interests. However, in the Lebanese context politicians both play the role as 
people’s political representatives, but at the same time they protect and promote the rights of 
the specific sect. In this respect, politicians also act somehow as interest groups and it is 
therefore important that as many sects as possible are political represented in order to be 
consensus based. The number of religious sects in Lebanon is expected to be approximately 
17. (Central Intelligence Agency) As a result of Article 24 of the constitution, electoral laws and 
the National Pact of 1943 seats in the parliament are to be shared proportionally by the 
different sects. The number of sects represented in the parliament has changed over the years 
due to electoral laws. In 1943, eight religious groups were represented whereas this number 
rose to 10 in 1960 and 11 in 1992 (Picard, 2002, p. 208). Therefore, the Lebanese interest group 
system can be characterised as increasingly consensus based, however as this is this is so 
abstract from Lijphart’s distinction of interest groups systems, this difference will not be 
taken into consideration when the characterisation of the confessional type of democracy 
proclaimed in the constitution will be made. 
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The aspects of the second dimension, the federal-unitary dimension, will now be analysed. 
The first difference on this dimension is to which extent power is centralised. In federations 
power is decentralised while it is centralised in unitary states. The Lebanese constitution does 
not mention a decentralisation of power and neither is Lebanon a federation. In this aspect, 
the Lebanese democracy is more majoritarian based.    
 
Article 16 which stipulates that “Legislative power shall be vested in a single body, the 
Chamber of Deputies” characterises the Lebanese democracy on the second difference which 
is unicameralism versus bicameralism. Lebanon has unicameralism which is a trait of 
majoritarian democracies and this is not surprising as this second difference is closely related 
to the first.  
 
The rigidity of the constitution and the frequency of judicial review which are the third and 
fourth differences will be analysed together as they both specifically concern the nature of the 
constitution. In accordance with the third difference, the Lebanese democracy is consensus 
based. This difference analyses the rigidity of a constitution, and the Lebanese constitution 
can only be changed if a two-thirds majority in the Chamber of Deputies recommends an 
amendment. If this exists the government is drawn into the process and if the amendment is 
accepted by them the Chamber is to vote for the constitutional change. The change can only 
be accepted if two-thirds of the Chamber’s members are present and a two-thirds majority 
exists. If the government rejects the change the Chamber of Deputies are given time to 
reconsider the amendment, but can ultimately force the government to accept it. The President 
can also suggest amendments but these also have to receive the same two-thirds majority 
support. The Lebanese constitution is thereby rigid and can only be changed if at least a two-
thirds majority exists (Articles 76, 77, 78 & 79). The fourth difference focuses on the existence 
and frequency of judicial review. It is here crucial which version of the Lebanese Constitution 
you look at. Before the last amendments to the constitution were made in 1990, it is unclear 
who were to judge if a law was in violation with the constitution. With the amendments of 
1990, a Constitutional Council was created in order to guide and judge in accordance with the 
constitution. This Council was to be independent of the government and parliament. It is 
therefore difficult to judge if the original Lebanese constitution encouraged a more consensus 
based or majoritarian based democracy on this matter. However, what can be said is that the 
amendments of 1990 made it more consensus based with the creation of an independent 
Constitutional Council (Article 19).                    
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The last of Lijphart’s ten differences is somehow irrelevant to discuss in relation with the 
constitution. The status of a country’s Central Bank is seldom included in a constitution and 
in the Lebanese case the Central Bank was first established in 1964. The classification of the 
Lebanese Central Banks’ independence has instead been made by using their homepage. 
Here, the central Bank is described in the following way,  “BDL is a legal public entity 
enjoying financial and administrative autonomy.” This suggests that the Central Bank is 
independent, however another place it says that:  
 
 “There is a regular coordination between the BDL and the Government in order 
 to ensure consistency between BDL's objectives and those of the Government. 
 Cooperation with the Government implies coordinating fiscal and monetary 
 policy measures.” (Banque Du Liban) 
 
Hereby, it is obvious that the Central Bank of Lebanon to a certain extent is dependent on the 
Lebanese government. Therefore, for this difference the Lebanese democracy is more 
majoritarian.  
 
In sum, Lijphart’s ten differences have been applied on the Lebanese constitution in order to 
judge which type of democracy the confessional system encourages. Looking at the first five 
differences, which concern concentration of executive power, power share between the 
legislative and the executive branch, two-party vs. multi-party system, disproportionality and 
proportionality and the nature of the interest group system, the Lebanese system is clearly 
more based on consensus than majoritarian decisions. The last five differences, which concern 
unitary vs. federal system, unicameralism vs. bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, frequency 
of judicial review and independence of Central Bank, create a more multifaceted picture. Four 
of them are slightly more majoritarian based while the one concerning constitutional rigidity 
is in line with consensus democracies. What is of interest in this project is the distinction of 
the confessional system as either majoritarian or consensus based. Even though aspects of 
both types of democracies are present in the constitution, consensus based principles are 
dominant.  
 
Before concluding the chapter a few final crucial aspects of the Lebanese constitution will be 
highlighted. The aspects analysed so far have been in relation to the democratic nature of the 
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confessional system. However, even though these are closely connected to confessionalism, 
many systems which are democratic but not confessional can be found. What makes the 
Lebanese system confessional is the proportional share of power between religious groups or 
sects. The main articles in the constitution that introduce this principle are Articles 24 and 95. 
The content of both articles have already been discussed as they are central in the consensus 
majoritarian characterisation. The confessional nature of Lebanon has not solely developed 
because of the constitution but also because of electoral laws and other laws based on this 
principle. The electoral laws of 1926 and the National Pact have already been mentioned as 
they are closely linked to articles 24 and 95. Article 24 refers to the electoral laws and it was 
in the 1926 electoral laws the proportional confessional and geographically share of seats in 
parliament was introduced first. The National Pact further developed this proportional 
representation in parliament and the equitable representation mentioned in Article 95 into a 
proportional representation in parliament and government in accordance with the 1932 
census. Further electoral laws have been made, but the proportionality in accordance with the 
1932 census was first abrogated with the 1989 Ta’if agreement (Picard, 2002, p. 70).  
 
Another important feature of Article 95 is that it states that this confessional share of power is 
a transitional measure. Confessionalism was never meant to be an established system in 
Lebanon. Another place where this comes through is the 22nd Article of the constitution. This 
article was abrogated in 1927 but reintroduced in 1990 and calls for the creation of a second 
chamber, a senate, consisting of all religious groups. This senate shall however first be 
created when the Chamber of Deputies is created on a non-confessional basis.    
 
Finally, after analysing the constitution with the help from Dahl’s seven institutions and 
Lijphart’s 10 differences, confessionalism can be characterised as a democratic political 
system based on consensus. What is now of interest is to see how this ideal of 
confessionalism was implemented in reality and how it influenced and shaped different 
aspects of the state of Lebanon.         
 
3.2 Political Culture as a result of sectarian loyalty 
 
The first aspect of Lebanese society that will be analysed is the political culture. What is of 
interest is not only a characterisation of Lebanese political culture, but more how political 
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culture has been influenced by the confessional system. Political culture is a highly debatable 
concept and can be defined in many different ways. Heywood (2007, p. 206) defines it as 
referring: 
 
 “to a people’s psychological orientation, political culture being the “pattern of 
 orientations” to political objects such as parties, government, the constitution, 
 expressed in beliefs, symbols and values.”  
 
In this project, the focus will especially be on politicians and peoples perception of and belief 
in confessionalism as the confessional principles are so apparent in the parliament, 
government and constitution. Due to the sectarian nature of Lebanon, sects instead of political 
parties will be used as the focus. Political parties did, and still do, exist in Lebanon, but 
sectarian loyalties and groupings are much stronger than political party affiliations.  
 
When Lebanon was expanded by France in 1920 the 17 different sects in the newly founded 
republic of Greater Lebanon were of very different backgrounds, complicating the making of 
a constitution acceptable for all communities. The Christian Maronites felt a close connection 
with the West, especially France, who supported the Christian groups in Lebanon. The Druze 
were less happy with the French occupation since the French support to the Maronites 
challenged their position in society.  
 
The Shi’a Muslim groups were found in the rural areas in the south and were for the most part 
poor and illiterate and since they for the most part had non-Shi’ite landlords governing them, 
they were not used to being asked in political matters and therefore did not have much to say 
about the new political situation. At the same time, they were often alienated from the other 
Muslim groups e.g. the Sunni’s who did not consider their religion Muslim. The Sunnis on 
the other hand were of urban origin, literate and very politically aware of the new situation, 
which they did not approve of. Sunni Islam was the dominant religion of the Ottoman Empire 
and the new constitution, where Christian interests seemed to get first priority, because of 
their connection with the French, was not popular among Sunnis (McDowall, 1996, p. 10). 
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Figure 1. A map showing the boundaries of both Greater Lebanon under the Ottoman Empire and present day 
Lebanon. The enclaves of some of the major sects are shown. The Maronites are mainly found the northern 
stretch of old Greater Lebanon, north of Beirut. The Druze and Greek Catholics are found to the south of the 
Maronites. In the south of Lebanon near the Israeli border the Shi’ites are prevalent. In the northern stretch of 
Lebanon and clustered around the major towns are the Sunnis (McDowall,1996, p. 5). 
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When the first constitution was made in 1926, it was an attempt to make a set of rules that 
could in some way satisfy all confessions of the country. However the response to it proved to 
be far from positive. The reality was that the Muslim and Christian communities each 
struggled for their nation. Muslims wanted to be a part of a large Arab nation and justified 
this by referring to the Ottoman Empire being Arab. The Christians wanted Lebanon to be a 
pure Christian-faced state, as their rightful outcome of their sufferings under the Great War. 
The French encouraged the Christian movements (Ziadeh, 2006, p. 88-91). In the period up to 
1943 many of the Muslims boycotted the elections, claiming that a Maronite president 
imposed on them could never be their legitimate representative (Ziadeh, 2006, p.95). The  
Muslims understood that the creation of the Lebanese state and its borders were “a product of 
the Quai d’Orsay rather than the creation of any Arab nationalist aspiration” (Fisk, 1990, p. 63). 
 
In the beginning the problem did not seem to be that the different groups disliked each other, 
or would not accept living in the same country. The problem was rather which identity the 
country should take on towards the outside world, this being Christian, Muslim, or simply 
Arab and obviously also how the influence of the different groups was to be distributed in the 
parliament and other institutions. The Maronites seemed to be favoured when influence was 
given, while the Shi’a Muslims seemed to be relegated to the periphery with little influence at 
all. Also, many groups where not used to being a part of a consensus democracy and simply 
did not know how to handle it, without acting too eagerly in bring through own requests.  
 
The confessional system that was attempted to be implemented in the first half of the 20th 
century was meant to unite all the confessions in the country in a formal way, but really it 
seemed to deepen the divide between the parts.  Given the fact that the confessional system 
often did not take many of the Muslims into consideration, the people of Lebanon ended up 
making societal decisions of their own. This was really only a continuation of the way the 
former Mount Lebanon had ruled itself, based on independence from the outside Ottoman 
Empire. It might not be so unusual though, considering the young age of the country, that 
loyalty to one’s sect or confession was stronger than the one towards a country within which 
very few actually had a national feeling as being Lebanese (McDowall, 1996, p. 7). Put 
differently, confessionalism did not create the sectoral differences as they already existed 
before confessionalism was introduced. Rather, the differences ossified under 
confessionalism. 
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In most of the Middle East the bonds of loyalty are grounded in kinship and confession, 
rendering the role of the state secondary. Lebanon is one of the most clear examples of this. 
Despite its reputation as one of the most sophisticated and developed Arabic states in the 20th 
century, kinship-loyalty seems to remain as the strongest unit in society. In daily life, this 
being education, employment, economic matters, social status, marriage and even –or 
especially –politics, loyalty to sect or confession dominates all matters and decisions 
(McDowall, 1996, p. 7).  
 
The constitutional system claimed to be defending a liberal society of nominally equal 
citizens, but really the clannish clientelist system was the reality. Notables and their families, 
disguised under communal representation was the political landscape. The elites continued to 
fill the parliament and it was later claimed that the systems inability to address the social and 
economic inequalities were fatal and maybe a major reason for the start of the civil war in 
1975 (Ziadeh, 2006, p. 97). At the same time though, until the civil war, the system had 
maintained the longest calm-period in the country, in a time were most other Arab countries 
were in great upheavals. But the wealth of the country caused urbanisation and polarisation, 
which lead to the creation of poor suburbs, where many of the desperate poor youth joined 
different militia groups. 
 
It was a fact, that the different sects and confessions were settled in each their area of the 
cities. In daily life each area were ruled by a so-called Za’Im7, and his men, the so-called 
qabadays. It worked the way that the Za’Im, who was usually a man of high rank, involved in 
the political life, would protect his clientele –the citizens in his area, providing them with 
jobs, economic support, maybe build schools or other charities, and in return the citizens 
would provide him with political support and votes. It could be compared to a mafia-system, 
but really most citizens where quite content with this system since it was easier for them to 
get requests through on this local-level, than by voting for unknown politicians in the other 
end of the country.  
 
This was a clear sign of disbelief in the new confessional system. Because people didn’t feel 
united with the other confessions around the country, they did not feel a need to show an 
                                               
7
 Referring to the leaders of Lebanese sectarian groups, militias, or other important traditional political leaders 
corresponding to some degree to what are often termed notables in writing on the Middle East.  
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active interest in implementing a system that would make shared rules for everyone. Most 
people were content with politics on the local level concerning their daily life and since the 
different confessions often lived in separate areas, an interest in a confessional system did not 
seem necessary in order to maintain local interests.  
 
This political subculture did not, as one might expect, disrespect the law, constitution or 
decisions made in the parliament, but it took decisions down to a street level, that recognised 
the needs of the individuals, in a way the constitution often could not. Most people were 
really more interested in a good job, welfare for their family, and peace in their 
neighbourhood, than politics concerning people they did not know. This made it hard for a 
shared national consciousness to develop between the different Lebanese people and therefore 
a belief in the confessional system never developed. As Haddad (1985, p. 26) puts it: 
 
 “It cannot be doubted that the political system, in protecting confessional 
 autonomy, confessionalised politics and society to a far greater degree than 
 ever intended. All issues came to be seen through confessional lenses.”
  
The Mafioso-like system meant that a favour for a favour would make your way to the top 
and therefore, as mentioned, the elites continued to fill the parliament. The Za’Ims where 
often part of the commercial and financial bourgeois and recognised the fact that a well-
running economy depended on political and social stability. Therefore they sometimes had to 
down-tone the demands from their communities, in order to negotiate with other leaders on 
economic matters (Johnson, 2001, p. 38-39). 
 
In the confessional system at the time, if one wanted to compete for a seat in the parliament, 
presidency etc. one had to make multi-confessional coalitions and find some allies within 
other candidates. This, as mentioned above, often meant that the Za’Ims would be alienating 
some parts of their clienteles (Johnson, 2001, p 39-40). 
 
“As a “system” clientelism represented a complex articulation of the Lebanese 
class and status structures with what Max Weber described as the “party” 
structure or political power. The relative stability of the system from 1943 to the 
early 1970’s was in large part due to the unity of the multiconfessional 
commercial-financial bourgeoisie, a class with clear interests in political 
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stability, the promotion of a free economy, and a limited role for the state. It was 
not that the state was weak by default. Rather the dominant class wanted to keep 
it weak in the sense of limiting its intervention in the economy” (Johnson, 2001, p. 
57). 
 
This system could be claimed to be one of the reasons to the peaceful period in Lebanon up 
until the civil war. The citizens received welfare and the Za’Ims received political support. 
Most politicians in the Lebanese parliament were actually Za’Ims in their home town or in 
their part of the city. 
 
As the rapidly growing economy in the decades after 1943 caused wealth and urbanisation 
between one part of the population, it also quickly caused a rural migration to the cities, that 
eventually lead to unemployment and poverty in the suburbs. The cleavage between rich and 
poor was growing, and there was a high demand for political interference, that could not be 
met. The delicate balance between the leaders and the fact that most of them were commercial 
orientated also caused a lazes-faire system. The elites were not able to lead a healthy 
economic development in the long run, and at the same time distribute the benefits between 
all groups in the country. Neither were they able to carry out reforms because of their lack of 
common interest for their country.  
 
A clear example of the above is the so called Shihab-reforms in the 1960’s. The Maronite 
President Fuad Shihab made several attempts, some with success, during the 1960s to 
introduce reforms in the civil service by establishing a Civil Service Council and a Central 
Inspection Board to reduce corruption and to base civil service recruitment more on merit 
rather than on patronage. It worked for a while and in this time he had public hospitals built, 
running water implemented in rural areas, among other things. Eventually though he was 
opposed by his political opponents (most of them being Za’Ims) who disliked the fact that the 
civil services he provided to the public weakened their own political power between their 
patronage. After his death in 1973, most of his reforms were soon forgotten. This shows how 
little will the political leaders in Lebanon had towards implementing confessionalism as an 
replacement to the current political culture –the clientelist system. 
 
As mentioned earlier by Dahl, one of the important factors that must be present in order to 
make a confessional system work, is willingness from the elite in the country to cooperate on 
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making the system work and believing that this is possible. The elite in Lebanon did co-
operate, not because they believed in the system, or had a shared Lebanese consciousness, but 
because of own interests. Few people wanted what was best for the country, and thus used 
their political position in order to gain own interests, or interests for their own community. At 
the same time the National Pact, that was supposed to bring people together, paid more 
attention to what could not be done, rather then what was desirable for the country. This again 
did not exactly contribute to a shared consciousness, and one can ask if the people of Lebanon 
ever really believed in the confessional system.  
 
Another measure that was taken to work against this political culture based on self-interests 
was the creation of mixed constituencies. The hope was that this would force politicians to 
co-operate across sects. If a Maronite Christian had to gain support in a constituency mainly 
inhabited by Shi’a Muslims he could not solely act in accordance with his sect’s interests. By 
doing so politicians would to a further extent live up to the part of Article 27 which states that 
“A member of the Chamber shall represent the whole nation.” (Lebanese Constitution, Arab Law 
Quarterly, 1997). However, not all constituencies were mixed and numerous cases of 
gerrymandering undermined the idea of mixed constituencies. Once again self-interests 
prevailed on the expense of a healthy political culture of bridge building and cooperation 
(Picard, 2002, p. 52-53).     
  
Therefore, the ideal of a confessional democracy did not manage to abolish the political 
culture that existed in the country already, and therefore did not unite the Lebanese people in 
one strong nation state. The lack of belief in the confessional system and a lack of Lebanese 
national feeling made the country seem split and vulnerable towards conflicts. As a result of 
this the susceptibility towards internal upheavals, especially if the systems was stressed, was 
high. It also meant that a possible military invasion from outside countries would be hard to 
defend. The fact that Lebanon had implemented a passive foreign policy and a practically non 
existing national army came to show as a disastrous defence, when combined with the split 
communities in the country, as we will elucidate in the following chapters.  
 
It needs to be emphasised that confessionalism did not create this patronage client political 
culture, but failed to create an alternative political culture. Hereby it becomes a failed 
implementation of an ideal. The ideal was that the consensus democracy and the nature of the 
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political institutions we analysed in chapter 3.1 should encourage cooperation and consensus. 
However, politicians did not co-operate, as it was only in their own self-interest. 
  
This lack of a Lebanese political culture based on consensus and cooperation made Lebanon 
more susceptible to conflicts because all sects followed their own agenda and their leader 
were used to acting purely in accordance with self-interests. If Lebanon had had a stronger 
political culture where the politicians believed in the ideal of the system, the different sects 
would perhaps have cooperated in finding a solution to issues such as PLO and the growing 
polarisation. At the same time, they would not have felt threatened by each other to such a 
large extent. 
 
As the relation between confessionalism and political culture has been analysed the focus will 
now shift to confessionalism’s effect on Lebanese sovereignty. Many of the same aspects 
already dealt with will be further scrutinized and a link between political culture and weak 
international Lebanese sovereignty will be explored more thoroughly.   
 
3.3 Weak International Sovereignty 
 
Dahl sees consociationalism, in this case confessionalism, as a necessity in highly 
heterogeneous societies with strong subcultures. Therefore, according to Dahl, 
confessionalism was an ideal model for Lebanon. However, by implementing confessionalism 
strong subcultures are accepted and even encouraged. Haddad noted:  
 
 “It cannot be doubted that the political system, in protecting confessional 
 autonomy, confessionalised politics and society to a far greater degree than 
 ever intended. All issues came to be seen through confessional lenses.”  
 (1985, p. 26) 
 
In two ways this undermined Lebanon’s international sovereignty: the true religious ‘face of 
Lebanon’ was questioned and self-interested alliances were formed between various actors. 
Both arose out of an inability of Lebanese politicians to form a conclusive consensus on 
domestic issues. As Haddad notes: 
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 “It is instructive to note[...] that the concept of sovereignty  
 derives not from international status but from the degree of internal 
 control exercised. Thus, “sovereignty” originally described states  
 whose control over their territory was paramount.” (1985, p. 31). 
 
As has been described in the section of political cultures, Lebanon’s ability to control the 
different sects was not strong. Indeed, one of the fundamental tenets of confessionalism is not 
to wield “control” over one’s territory. As a result several countries exploited this weakened 
form of sovereignty and what is of interest is how confessionalism contributed to this. 
 
International sovereignty is defined twofold. First political sovereignty, which is the ability to 
command political obedience, often through a coercive force, as opposed to legal sovereignty. 
Second, external sovereignty which is the state’s place in the international order and its 
capacity to act as an independent and autonomous entity (Heywood, 2007, p. 131). Thus, 
Lebanon’s sovereignty arises out of the respect accorded to its national wishes and its military 
might.  
 
Three examples of Lebanon’s undermined sovereignty will now be outlined. First, how the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation entered Lebanon and based their militant operations there. 
Second, how Syria exploited various alliances within Lebanon to gain influence within 
Lebanon and third, how Israel underlined its weak sovereignty by two military interventions. 
 
3.3.1 Confessionalist facilitation of the entry of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
This chapter will attempt to develop the argument that confessionalism facilitated the entry of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), which had disastrous foreign policy 
implications and ended with the invasion of Israel on multiple occasions in 1978 & 1982. 
Evidence will be presented for the perception that Lebanon was perceived as a weaker state 
with questionable sovereignty in the eyes of other Arab nations, thus rendering them to more 
susceptible to diplomatic pressure. The Egyptian Initiative (1969) will be discussed as a clear 
example of such diplomatic pressure being placed upon Lebanon to accept further Palestinian 
refugees, which allowed the PLO to build its organisation within Lebanon. Then it will be 
shown that prior to such initiatives and presence of the PLO Lebanon’s relation with Israel 
was actually neutral, or even cordial, before turning sour. This would suggest that the entry of 
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the PLO and the pressure preceding the refugee influx partly as a result of confessionalism 
incited Israel to invade Lebanon when it possibly would not have otherwise. 
 
Palestinian refugees have long been a part of Lebanese history, dating back to the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war. More than 150,000 refugees entered Lebanon as a result of that war and “virtually 
all Lebanese supported both the Palestinian’s view and their cause in general” (Haddad, 1985, 
p. 32-33). However, by 1971 two more recent events had occurred that increased the number of 
Palestinian refugees and placed more strain on Lebanon. First, there was the second Arab-
Israeli war of 1967, creating increased numbers of Palestinian refugees across the Middle East 
and second, the expulsion of Palestinian refugees from Jordan by Jordan itself. Neither event 
immediately suggests that Lebanon should end up with more refugees, but geographic 
proximity and diplomatic pressure conspired to exploit the susceptibility of Lebanon and 
ensure that a disproportionate number refugees would end up in Lebanon.  
 
The diplomatic pressure came from the Arab world in the form of the Cairo Agreement 
(1969). Since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 there had been an increased militant activity by the 
PLO against Israel within Lebanon, including raids. “Such raids had been a reality before 
1967, but not from Lebanon. Predictably Palestinian raids led to Israeli reprisals” (Haddad, 
1985, p. 33). This emergence of a Palestinian resistance posed a dilemma for Lebanon; despite 
being both supportive and tolerant of the plight of the Palestinians, the increase in militant 
activity against Israel was contrary to Lebanon’s desire to be a non-confrontational state and 
also the “Lebanese Army could not handle the Israeli reprisals” (Haddad, 1985, p. 44). 
Consequently, Lebanon called upon the Egyptian President to mediate a deal (the later named 
Cairo Agreement). It was a disaster for Lebanon: despite recognising Lebanon’s sovereignty 
it allowed the PLO commandos to continue to use Lebanon as a base for their operations 
(Haddad, 1985, p. 42). This policy stands in stark contrast to other states where PLO commando 
action was “either prohibited (Egypt), [later] eliminated (Jordan) or strictly controlled 
(Syria)” (Haddad, 1985, p. 44).  
 
There were two main consequences of the Cairo Agreement. First, the southern Lebanese 
began to tire and resent creation of the PLO’s creation of a state within a state in south 
Lebanon, a clear breach of the Cairo Agreement that allowed the Palestinians to remain. In 
May 1973 fights broke out between southern Lebanese and the PLO, which irritated Syria as 
they funded the PLO at the time (Haddad, 1985, p. 43). Secondly, the legitimization of the PLO 
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led to the entrenchment of attacks on Israel. Israel led retaliatory raids and eventually invaded 
in 1978. It was turned away by international pressure, but subsequently invaded Lebanon 
again, in 1982. If Lebanon had the luxury of banning, repressing or controlling ruthlessly the 
PLO like its Arab neighbours then it is much less likely that it would have had to endure a 
conflict with Israel. As Haddad points out, Lebanon “could not handle the Israeli reprisals 
and Lebanon’s internal delicate equilibrium could not survive the shock of a massive influx of 
armed elements from the outside” (1985, p. 44). 
  
In sum, Lebanese sovereignty had been undermined as Lebanon had been perceived as an 
‘easier’ country in relation to its Arab neighbours. As a result of confessionalism Lebanon 
had a variety of ‘faces’ for its country, it could either be Christian, since the most powerful 
position of president is traditionally Christian, or it could be Sunni or Shi’a. This lack of 
thorough ‘Arabness’ has allowed other countries to demand Lebanon do a politically 
unsavoury act in order to prove their worth within the Middle East, for example the 
absorption of the PLO (Haddad, 1985, p. 32). As a result of diplomatic pressure and the Cairo 
Agreement, the PLO’s actions were legitimized and proliferated. Cordial relations that existed 
between Lebanon and Israel, which had begun to sour after the 1967 war, quickly deteriorated 
(when they could have been ameliorated) and led to subsequent Israeli invasions as well as 
the continued weakening of Lebanese sovereignty.   
 
3.3.2 Syria in Lebanon 
As mentioned before Syria has several times made interventions in Lebanon and both fought 
and helped the sects within. What are the reasons for Syria’s interest in Lebanon and why has 
Syria managed to breach Lebanese sovereignty so easily? Before explaining Syria’ interest in 
Lebanon, a short introduction to Syria and its history will be presented.  
 
Introduction to Syria 
After the break down of the Ottoman Empire, Syria was occupied by the French like some 
other areas in the Middle East. In 1941, France formally recognized Syria as an independent 
state, but Syria first achieved real independence in 1946 when the last French soldier left the 
country. Syria had their first national election in 1943 where Shukri Quwwatli of the National 
Bloc was elected as the first president of the independent Syria. In 1948 Syria joined the other 
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Arab countries in the war against the new state of Israel. The result was an Israeli victory and 
since there has been several regional conflicts especially between Syria and Israel. 
 
The history of Syrian leadership is filled with coups and unfair elections. After the Second 
World War military coups dominated the country and military dictators replaced each other 
again and again. In between the coups elections where held, but since most of them resulted in 
re-elections of former dictators the value of the elections can be questioned. In 1955 
Quwwatli the first president of Syria was elected again and it was during his reign that Syria 
and Egypt created the United Arab Republic (UAR). However, in 1961 the military and 
civilians overthrew the government and re-established Syria as a sovereign and independent 
state, called The Syrian Arab Republic. Through the beginning of the 1960s the Arab Baath 
Socialist Party had gained power which led to several coups in the second half of the decade 
and ended in 1971 where the general, Hafez al-Assad, who had led the coup in 1970, installed 
himself as president. He kept the position as leader of Syria until his death after 1990 when 
his son took over. 
 
Greater Syria 
The dream of a Greater Syria has been a vision for many Syrian leaders and expansion of the 
borders has continually present on the national agenda. Looking at Syria’s geographical 
reality, Syria borders five other countries. To the south of Syria is Jordan. Although Jordan is 
mostly desert and not very lucrative, Syria has still had some confrontations as for example 
the famous Black September where Syria supported PLO in their fight against Jordan. 
However, Jordan is neutral in most matters and fully accepted as an Arab state and Syria 
would therefore not be popular in the Arab world if an invasion took place. In the north lies 
Turkey which is far too powerful to ever consider challenging. Iraq borders Syria to the east, 
but taking Iraq’s size, power and allies into consideration an invasion would be impossible. If 
Syria wanted to expand, it had to be to the west. Israel is very disliked in the Arab world, but 
at the same time militarily competent. Syria has several times fought against Israel but 
without any successful outcome. Lebanon on the other hand, was as a mixed Muslim and 
Christian country in many ways an obvious target. Due to its ethnic diversity its Arab identity 
was often questioned and additionally it possessed a weak army. An actual invasion of 
Lebanon has never taken place, but Syria has continuously intervened in Lebanon affairs, 
especially during and after the Lebanese Civil War where Syria had troops in Lebanon. 
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3.3.4 Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War 
One of the reasons for the Civil War in Lebanon was the establishment of PLO and the 
increasing number of Palestinian refugees. In the mid-1960s Syria, and other Arab countries, 
demanded Lebanon to open their borders and support the Palestinians even though other 
countries including Syria rejected the refugees themselves. Lebanon’s wish of Arab 
recognition forced them to accept the demands that resulted in a large increase of Muslim 
Palestinians in Lebanon. The Christians felt increasingly threatened by the growing number of 
Muslims, while the left-winged Muslims on the other hand saw PLO and the refugees as 
allies. In the end of the 1960s Syria supported PLO in their fight against the Christian 
dominated Lebanese army that tried to re-gain their lost control of southern Lebanon. Syria 
had previously forced PLO out of Syria, but because of Syria’s tense relationship to Israel, 
they were interested in a strong PLO to support their fight against Israel. In 1973, fights 
between PLO allied with other left-winged Muslims groups, as Lebanese National Movement 
(LNM) and the Lebanese army occurred. Syria closed its borders as an act of reprisal and to 
signal their displeasure with the Lebanese army. However, Syria tried later to act as mediator, 
but without success. In 1976 they responded to the Christian President of Lebanon’s call for 
aid and began to fight PLO and the left-winged Muslims groups (Haddad, 1985, p. 41-44).  
 
The fact that Syria, a Muslim country, supported the Christians in Lebanon was somehow 
unexpected. Later the Arab League created the Arab Deterrent Force in order to stabilize the 
Lebanese society. It consisted of troops from e.g. Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Syria and was 
supposed to be under the Lebanese Presidents control. Since the Syrian army constituted the 
most of the force, it was basically under their control, and instead of stabilising the situation 
they used the soldiers to support the PLO and LNM’s attack on Israel (Engber, Haddad, 1985, 56-
60). 
 
The reasoning behind Syria’s original support of the Christians was that president Assad 
believed it would be easier to manipulate and control a Christian lead country than a radical 
left-wing Muslim state, which Lebanon could turn into if the LNM won. The reason for that 
was that a Muslim governed Lebanon would be able to strengthen their ties the whole Arab 
world. As long as the Christians had influence in governing the country they would maintain 
their status a half Muslim, half Christian Arab state. By doing so they would need all the 
allied they could get, for example Syria (Pan). Syria’s alliances changed often. First they 
supported PLO, then the Christians and then again PLO. The reason for this was among other 
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things that Syria saw a way to lead a proxy war against Israel. By supporting the PLO, Syria 
could damage Israel without actually declaring war and therefore not risking to loose territory 
like in the war in 1973 where the Golan Heights were seized by Israel. 
 
Syria continued throughout the Lebanese Civil War their support of PLO and the fighting 
against Israel through proxy methods. The internal fighting between Christians and Muslims 
in Lebanon made it possible for Syria to intervene since both parts needed support. First Syria 
supported the PLO in their fight for residence in Lebanon; this was because Syria itself was 
not interested in having PLO staying inside their borders. When the Civil War started Syria 
supported the Christians in order to maintain their control in Lebanon, but when the 
possibility for them to fight Israel through PLO emerge they quickly shifted and actually 
began fighting the Christian again. One of the reasons that made it possible for Syria to 
interfere in Lebanon was that the different sects in Lebanon did not cooperate. Lebanon 
lacked a coherent foreign policy and their sovereignty was weak. The society’s susceptibility 
made it possible for Syria to act in accordance with its self-interests and exploit the apparent 
weaknesses. 
 
3.3.5 Introduction to Israel 
The third example of interventions that undermined Lebanese sovereignty are the actions of 
Israel. Before they are discussed, a brief context will be provided. The modern state of Israel 
was created in 1948 but historical memories date back more than 3500 years to a central place 
in Jewish religious culture. It was believed that the establishment of the kingdom of Israel 
after the exodus represented the fulfillment of God’s promise to the Jews that they were 
chosen to complete their destiny in Zion. David Ben-Gurion held the offices of prime minister 
and minister of defense for most of the period from 1949 – 1963. The main features of the 
political system were determined by 1949. Israel was established as a parliamentary 
democracy with a unicameral legislature (the Knesset) composed of 120 elected 
representatives. Candidates ran on a national slate elected by the nation at large.  
 
Israel is sometimes referred to as a “Party state” because of the decisive influence the Israeli 
parties could exercise. The Israeli people voted for a party not for a candidate. This makes it 
difficult for individuals to enter politics without the mechanism of a party. When elections 
were announced the leadership would prepare a numbered list of candidates and present it to 
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the public. Voters selected and elected the party of their choice. A party receiving 25 percent 
of the votes would get 30 seats of the 120 and these seats would go to the first 30 names on 
the party list. By this the party leaders have a lot of power that could be used behind closed 
doors and with little accountability.  
 
According to the law any party that received more than one percent of the votes was entitled 
to representation in the Knesset. This meant that there were no needs for the political groups 
to modify extreme positions in order to gain seats. Parties at far ends of the political spectrum 
had good chances of receiving one percent of the votes. When the popular vote is divided 
among many different parties it entails that no single party receive absolute majority. It is 
normal for each Knesset to contain representatives from 10-15 different parties. The result of 
this is that the party with most seats could form government only by seeking out coalition 
partners. Coalition governments often require compromises and concession. 
 
Israel in Lebanon 
In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon. Clashes between Israeli–Palestinians and Israeli–Syrians led 
to the creation of “the multinational force” led by the United States of America. Israel 
withdrew its troops in 1985. In the following period confrontations between and within 
communities resulted in a new outburst of civil war (Picard, 2002, p. 121). 
 
In the first phase of Israeli independence a close relationship existed between Israeli Jews and 
Christian entities in Lebanon. Lebanese Maronite leaders considered the relationship a 
community of fate between Jews and Maronites against the pressure from Islam and pan-Arab 
nationalists and supported the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In 1946 a formal 
agreement of relations was made between the Jewish agency and the Maronite church. 
However the agreement had limited value since the Maronite church insisted on concealment 
(Rabinovich, 1985, p. 104).  
 
Diaries of David Ben-Gurion from 1948-49 and files from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Israel have shown the extent of relations between Israel and various Lebanese politicians at 
the end of the 1940s and revealed an Israeli contact with a Phalangist emissary shortly after 
the war. It was of great importance to ensure the power of a Christian leader. In 1954-55 Ben-
Gurion and Moshe Dayan, among other Israeli leaders, thought that Israel could take 
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advantage of a separatist Maronite sentiment which could entail pro-Israeli changes in 
Lebanon (Rabinovich, 1985, p. 105).  
 
In the 1950s talks took place between the Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and his 
predecessor David Ben-Gurion about supporting a Lebanese officer in order to take leadership 
of a Christian regime allied with Israel. The utility of a state reduced to the borders of the pre-
mandate Lebanon included the risks and advantages of conquering south Lebanon all the way 
to the Litani River which would give Israel the possibility of controlling 55 percent of its 
waters. This was however rendered impossible by the Palestinian resistance in the country 
(Picard, 2002, p. 122). 
 
Prior to the invasion in Lebanon it was in Israel’s interest to support Lebanon in building an 
army as a buffer, especially against a Syrian supremacy, and detect any activities and 
influence on domestic politics from pan-Arabs or Palestinian militants. By finding 
weaknesses and encouraging minority separatism, Israel attempted to divide and weaken what 
it saw as “hostile communities”. Furthermore Israel tried to enlarge its own territorial base 
which borders never had been fixed (Picard, 2002, p. 123).  
 
Henceforth Israeli politics towards Lebanon was dominated by two primary concerns. First, 
ensure security of the border areas Galilee and Hula. Therefore, Israel began a cross-border 
war with PLO in southern Lebanon in 1968. In spite of Israel military hauteur they were 
ineffective against the guerilla war conducted from across the border. The second was a 
political affair. In the 1973 Malkert agreement, the “Arab league” recognized the Palestine 
Liberation Organization as “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians”. Israel 
considered this a great hindrance to peace in the Middle East and did everything in their 
power to discredit and eliminate the Palestine Liberation Organization from the near eastern 
areas. Altogether the issues of Lebanon were from an Israeli point of view controlled by two 
factors: security and the undermining of Palestine Liberation Organization (Picard, 2002, p. 123). 
 
Until the 1970s Israel considered Lebanon a harmless Arab neighbor. In the winter of 1975- 
76 the collapse of the Lebanese state and political system, the growing influence of PLO and 
its allies as well as Syrian intervention and the Cairo agreement convinced the government of 
Israel that the Lebanese status quo was no longer intact. Maronite leaders invited Israel to 
intervene but they declined. From an Israeli point of view a Syrian takeover was preferred to 
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PLO dominance. For that reason Israel accepted the Syrian takeover with limitations (the red 
line) arranged by the US. The Syrian army ADF would not invade areas south of the Litani 
river, would not use air force or employ ground to air missiles on Lebanese territory. Israel 
would continue its relations with status quo militias consisting of supply of weaponry 
(Rabinovich, 1985, p. 105). 
 
The radical changes in Israeli foreign policy towards Lebanon occurred in 1977 at the election 
when Menachem Begin and the Likud bloc won power. Begin’s foreign policy was more 
audacious and active. He sympathized with Lebanese Christians and considered Israel a 
protector of western and Christian interests. (Rabinovich, 1985, p. 106). As a response to a 
Palestinian attack in Israel in March 1978 Israel invaded south Lebanon. This was Israel’s 
first attempt to enter Lebanon and demonstrated Israel’s low opinion of Lebanese sovereignty. 
Of more interest to Israel were the interests of Christians in Lebanon, and this is evidence of 
how the various alliances arising from different confessions undermined Lebanese 
sovereignty. The invasion led to the development of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
established by the UN to preserve Lebanese territorial integrity. Clearly, some still respected 
Lebanon’s legal sovereignty. This force was strongly supported by the US. UNIFIL’s task 
was to secure the border-areas from armed forces. This was rendered impossible by the Israeli 
sponsored militia of Major Sa’d Haddad that moved into the area even before UNIFIL was 
created. UNIFIL was caught in constant crossfire between PLO and the Haddad militia. 
UNIFIL was repeatedly under direct attack from Haddad at times what seemed to be from 
inside Israeli territory (McDowall, 1996, p.15). 
 
In 1978 Israel denied to give in to UNIFIL and cede the border areas it contemplated as 
“security zone” (McDowell, 1996, p. 15). 1n 1977-78 Israel built an elaborate defense system 
along the Lebanese border, they supported three enclaves of major Sa’d Haddad’s militia and 
bombed Palestinian targets in Lebanon (Rabinovich, 1985, p. 107). In August 1982 Bashir 
Gemayel was elected president and signed a Lebanese-Israeli peace agreement. The treaty 
included an agreement of withdrawal of all foreign troops in Lebanon. Few months later all 
agreements collapsed Bashir Gemayel was assassinated (Picard, 2002, p. 124). 
 
The war in Lebanon was a costly affair for Israel. After invading more than half of Lebanon it 
was neither possible to prolong the occupation or gain any kind of political capital from their 
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military victory. All achieved by operation “peace for Galilee” was a devastated Lebanon 
(Picard, 2002, p. 124). 
 
Israel’s involvement in the Lebanese conflict did therefore not bring the results Israel had 
hoped for. However, it was still a clear example of the weakness of Lebanese sovereignty 
brought about in part by the existence and entrenchment of confessions and alliances between 
different political actors. The expulsion of Israeli troops in 1978 by UNIFIL signaled that 
Lebanese sovereignty still somehow existed, however, this was clearly undermined by the 
Haddad militia’s increased involvement in the conflict. Furthermore, Israel invaded again in 
1982 and first left in 1985. In other words, due to the weakness of Lebanese sovereignty and 
the superiority of the Israeli military, Israel could act as they wished, the only result of this 
being an intensification and deterioration of the Lebanese conflict.     
 
PLO conclusion 
First, the consequences of the true ‘face’ of Lebanon being exploited. The continued presence 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) undermined Lebanese sovereignty as their 
militant actions on Israel were against Lebanon’s national wishes. The PLO took advantage of 
the inability of Lebanese politicians to govern Lebanon with a clear consensus on PLO’s 
activities and the weakness of the army (as it would not be able to effectively remove the 
PLO). If the PLO was clearly told to leave, as they were by other Arab countries (Haddad, 1985, 
p. 44) then it is unlikely that they would have remained in Lebanon. Even the Palestinians 
recognised that the longer they remained in the country the higher the price on Lebanon’s 
sovereignty would be. This was only further reinforced when the Cairo Agreement of 1969 
ordered Lebanon to accept the presence of the PLO. Thus confessionalism contributed to a 
sense of weaker international sovereignty; a result only compounded when PLO entered and 
remained. 
 
Syrian conclusion 
Another consequence of the self-interested alliances was Syria’s intervention in Lebanon. 
When the Civil War started, Syria saw its chance to deploy military inside Lebanon and that 
made it possible for them to put pressure on the Lebanese government and though that 
weakened the sovereignty of Lebanon. Since Lebanon had no substantial strong army they 
were unable oppose Syria’s intervention. Later when it became clear for the Lebanese 
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government that Syria’s troops contributed more to the strife than the solution of the conflict 
they were again unable to throw them out because of their small army.  
 
Syria first supported the Christian groups, gained power through them, and later they begun to 
wage proxy war against Israel through PLO, and since they begun to support PLO they 
actually fought the Christian groups. Syria clearly took advantage of the large number of 
different groups within Lebanon. They supported some financial, some with weaponry and 
others with troops. On this way Syria fuelled the strife by supporting both sides to own 
advantage instead of trying to solve the problems with the aim of constructing or respecting a 
sovereign state of Lebanon. 
 
Israeli conclusion 
Third, the self-interested alliances that were formed partly account for Israel’s interventions. 
Israel took advantage of Lebanon’s weak sovereignty that was in part caused by a 
susceptibility of confessionalism. They invaded Lebanon on two occasions to tackle the 
problem of PLO in 1978 and 1982 and on the second time they remained in Lebanon, except 
for a brief period, until well after 1990. The continued military occupation of Lebanon by 
another internationally recognised country- Israel- also undermined Lebanon’s sovereignty, in 
addition to the effects of the PLO. Another reason for Israel’s intervention was the fact that 
due to a lack of consensus agreement and fruitful co-operation between the sects in Lebanon a 
weak sense of internal control was projected to the other international communities. For 
example, the Christians welcomed the Israeli into the country and continued to support them, 
even when the Shi’a Muslims and other sects had ceased to support their presence. 
 
The conclusion drawn from these separate examples of Lebanon’s undermined international 
sovereignty was that confessionalism introduced a susceptibility: that if the politicians could 
not function and form consensus based agreements on issues of foreign policy and invasions, 
then the international sovereignty would be threatened more easily. As a consequence 
Lebanon’s susceptibility to conflict increased, and conflict was more likely to break out, as 
did happen in Lebanon. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The problem formulation of this project is “How has confessionalism made the state of 
Lebanon susceptible to conflict”. In addressing this problem formulation the nature of 
confessionalism was investigated, as a democracy and what type, before looking at how it did 
increase Lebanon’s susceptibility to conflict. Finally, political stressors- the PLO entry and 
Syrian and Israeli interventions- were examined as evidence preying on the susceptibility and 
thus resulting in conflict. First, a summary of the project’s arguments will be outlined before 
the project’s four conclusions are drawn. Then the limitations will be discussed as well as 
further research and problems to address. Finally, the prospects of confessionalism will be 
considered. 
 
4.1 4 Conclusions 
4.1.1 Susceptibility for self-interested action rather than consensus action 
The idea behind confessionalism was to implement a democratic system without coming 
between or disrespecting the population’s many different beliefs. The reasoning is: by 
creating a system where all the confessions were represented, they would need to work 
together in order to produce a functional society. In the constitution this cooperation was 
emphasised, but even though confessionalism was supposed to encourage cooperation 
between the sects, the politicians saw an opportunity to avoid co-operation and instead just 
pursue their self-interests. This is especially shown by the clannish clientelism that developed 
and the position of the Za’Ims. More evidence for this lack of cooperation was the lack of 
subsequent censuses. No census had been held since 1932 reflecting the lack of will to 
cooperate and the elites’ fear of losing power. Their actions were therefore not consensus 
based, but instead self-motivated.  
 
4.1.2 Lack of will and belief in the confessionalist system 
Another reason to the failure of the implementation of confessionalism in Lebanon could be 
the fact that the will and belief in the system was insufficient among both politicians as well 
as the population. Both Dahl and Haddad argues that this belief is one of the most important 
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preconditions for making a consociational democracy work. However it seemed missing in 
Lebanon. A clear piece of evidence of this was that during most of the 20th century no 
constructive attempts were made among politicians towards updating the last census from 
1932. As the demographic reality changed this created resentment towards the system among 
the population, especially between the Shi’a Muslims. As the proportions between their share 
of power and the size of their confessional group became uneven, they eventually felt 
alienated from the system. 
 
4.1.3 Weakened international sovereignty 
Dahl sees consociationalism, or in this case confessionalism, as a necessity in highly 
heterogeneous societies with strong subcultures. Therefore, according to Dahl, 
confessionalism was an ideal model for Lebanon. However, by implementing confessionalism 
strong subcultures are accepted and even encouraged. In two ways this undermined 
Lebanon’s sovereignty: the true religious ‘face of Lebanon was questioned and self-interested 
alliances were formed between various actors. Both arose out of an inability of Lebanese 
politicians to form a conclusive consensus on domestic issues. If the politicians could not 
function and form consensus based agreements on issues of foreign policy and invasions, then 
the international sovereignty would be threatened more easily. As a consequence Lebanon’s 
susceptibility to conflict increased, and conflict is more likely to break out. With the 
continued interference of the PLO, Israel and Syria, these susceptibilities gave way to tragic 
actualities in Lebanon. 
 
4.1.4 Consensus democracy’s inbuilt susceptibility 
The nature of the fourth conclusion differs from the previous three in that it concerns a more 
abstract understanding of the construct of confessionalism, as opposed to the implementation 
and consequence of practicing confessionalism in reality. Lijphart argues that consensus 
democracies are more democratic than majoritarian democracies and should therefore be 
more revered. However, in some aspects consensus democracies are more susceptible to 
conflicts than majoritarian democracies. It can be argued that the confessionalist system is an 
extreme version of consensus democracy: all consensus democracies are reliant on different 
actors can come to some agreement. When decisions are made numerous opinions have to be 
considered and the decision has to be in accordance with various interests. Conversely, in 
majoritarian democracies the number of actors is considerably reduced and on the political 
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scene you normally have two main actors/parties, and one of them makes up the government. 
This will increase the ability to act swiftly and effectively if the system is threatened or put 
under pressure, simply because cross-sectional agreement is not necessary. On the other hand 
when a consensus democracy face severe stressors, from either outside or within, conclusive 
agreement between several actors is needed and this can constrain the ability to act. This does 
not imply that the majoritarian type of democracy betters the consensus type, it is just crucial 
that countries with consensus democracies, especially countries with consensus democracies 
are aware of this inherent susceptibility. Especially, this is important in countries with 
confessionalist and consociationalist system where consensus and agreement is crucial. 
 
4.2 Limitations of the conclusions 
As this project has only focused on a single example of confessionalism it will inevitably be 
difficult to clearly distinguish any general ‘rules’ that may exist from context specific 
empirical generalisations regarding Lebanon. Ideally the project would compare different 
examples of confessionalism, look at the similarities between the two and distinguish context 
from ‘theory’. In this respect our conclusion is weaker than if it contained comparisons. 
However, as there is only one country which practices confessionalism a direct comparison 
would be very difficult. The best alternative would be to look at consociationalism. Whilst it 
may be a broader concept that confessionalism, it at least encompasses it. Then at least two 
comparisons can be made: first the constitutions can be compared and analysed and second 
the empirical consequences of consociationalism in each country can be analysed. 
 
Another limitation to this project is the choice and application of theory. Theory of 
democracy was chosen and even though this is very relevant to discuss when you scrutinize 
confessionalism, theory of other political systems could have been used as well to strengthen 
the analysis of the system. The choice of theorists could also have been broader and especially 
the application of a theorist critical toward consensus democracy could have shed light on 
other perspectives and possible flaws in consensus democracies. However, due to the 
limitations for this project, Robert A. Dahl and Arend Lijphart were the only two theorists 
chosen. These are both prominent and respected democratic theorists and their theories were 
found to be of great relevance in order to classify and understand the confessional political 
system.   
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4.3 Further Research 
 
Dahl suggests that there are preconditions that must be fulfilled if a democracy, and 
confessionalism is, is to succeed. Does this theory hold true for other consociational 
democracies? Put differently, does precondition fulfilment in other consociational systems 
predict successful outcome? 
 
In this project the focus has been on two variables of political culture and international 
sovereignty. Therefore, an analysis of other consociational countries’ political culture and 
international sovereignty would be interesting and at the same time reveal if similarities with 
Lebanon can be found. Maybe the same susceptibilities will be found but due to the lack of 
stressors a well-functioning system has been established, thereby avoiding the immense 
turmoil Lebanon has experienced. Another possible outcome is that other consociational 
democracies have taken measures to work against the susceptibility or reduce the possible 
stressors. In such a case a further research exploiting the areas where the Lebanese system 
could improve and draw on other countries’ experiences would be apposite.      
 
As mentioned previously, comparing empirical outcomes of confessionalist systems is not 
currently possible as there is only one example of it in practice. Instead, consociationist 
systems may prove instructive when unpacking the construct of confessionalism, albeit in a 
more indirect way. Thus, when one looks at the empirical consequences of consociationalism, 
as opposed to the ideal, can any meaningful conclusions be drawn in relation to 
confessionalism? 
 
Despite investigating susceptibilities within systems, it is also important to consider the 
stressors that prey upon these susceptibilities. One factor noted in this project has been 
geographical surroundings. Thus, it may be of interest to carry out some analysis of 
geographical context and see if it can predict a successful outcome of consociational systems. 
For example, Switzerland is often seen as the prime example of a well-functioning 
consociationalist democracy. Neutrality is, in the eyes of many, one of Switzerland’s main 
characteristics. If further research was to be made as a continuation of this project it could be 
of great interest to analyse if Switzerland’s policy of neutrality is connected to its prosperous 
consociationalist system. Is it the case that Switzerland is aware of its own susceptibility to 
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conflicts and therefore has chosen this neutrality policy in order to protect its consociationalist 
system from stresses? 
 
4.4 Prospects for confessionalism 
 
 
Finally, drawing from the conclusions a few general points about the prospects of 
confessionalism can be made. First of all, if a country chooses confessionalism it is crucial 
that the ideal is implemented in reality. The proportional share of power, which is a central 
tenet of confessionalism, has to reflect the demographic reality in the country. In the case of 
Lebanon its proportionality reflected the 1932 census until the Ta’if agreement, and was 
therefore clearly misleading in most of the years between 1943 and 1989. This proved to be a 
constant stress on the confessional system and undermined the legitimacy of a system 
designed to make power sharing as fair as possible. Regular censuses are therefore necessary 
in order to main a confessional system that reflects a proportional share of power. In the case 
of Lebanon this was however not the only problem with implementing the ideal of 
confessionalism.  
 
The second problem was related to the idea of co-operation and consensus based decisions. 
That the political institutions encourage this is not enough, further measures must be taken in 
order to secure its practice in reality. The Lebanese political culture is clear evidence of this 
need to maintain the co-operative ideal. Other countries that wish to implement the system of 
confessionalism can observe that measures must be taken in order to create a political culture 
that does not work against the idea of cooperation and consensus. Mixed constituencies are 
one example of measures to take in order to secure this. If the various political leaders believe 
in the system and try to build bridges between the different groups a national culture or 
identity can be created as a supplement to the sub-cultures. A national common culture that 
can gather all sub-cultures will make a country stronger and thereby less susceptible to 
conflicts. 
 
Another consideration that must be made is the geographical reality. The stressors Lebanon 
was exposed to were, to a large extent, regional and therefore not solely self-inflicted. It is not 
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possible to say how the confessional system in Lebanon would have fared in a more stable 
region, but regional considerations must be made before adopting the confessional system.       
 
Confessionalism can therefore still offer hope for ethnical diverse countries. However, it is 
crucial to be aware of the weaknesses and limitations the system has. At the same time, 
countries that chose confessionalism must do everything possible to ensure that cooperation 
and consensus is not only integrated in political institutions but also in the political culture 
and everyday life. Before stable democracies can be created, numerous ethnically diverse 
countries must first deal with the issue of national identity (Hinnebusch, 2005, p. 31-35). If these 
countries succeed in creating societies that on the one hand respect the various sub-cultures 
but at the same time are coherent and based on co-operation, the successful adoption of 
confessionalism could increase. 
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Glossary  
 
Arab 
A person from the Middle East or North Africa, whose ancestors lived in the Arabian 
Peninsula (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary).  
 
Cairo Agreement 
This secret agreement between the Lebanese Army (with the knowledge of the President and 
prime minister) and the PLO was signed in Cairo on November 2nd, 1969, after a series of 
clashes between the two sides. The agreement allowed the PLO to operate military out of 
Lebanon, although it stipulated that its activities should be coordinated with the Lebanese 
Army Command. For the PLO the agreement was a juridical recognition of its military role in 
Lebanon. For the Lebanese right wing movement it was an unacceptable surrender of 
Lebanese sovereignty. In 1987 the Lebanese parliament voted to abrogate the agreement 
(Abukhalil, 1998, p. 47). 
 
Confessionalism 
The term ”confessionalism” is in many aspects unfamiliar and seldom used. Highly respected 
dictionaries as the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary and Oxford Dictionary on Politics 
do not include it and neither is it included in many books on political systems.  
Originally the term has derived from “confession” which in the Oxford Advanced Dictionary 
is elaborated as “a statement of your religious beliefs, principles, etc”. Today, 
“confessionalism” has as least three dimensions, a religious, a political and one in poetry. In 
this project “confessionalism” is applied in connection with its political significance (Oxford 
Advance Learners Dictionary). Confessionalism is here understood as a system of 
government where power is proportionally distributed between different communities which 
are distinguished by their religious and ethnic differences. The term is closely connected with 
Lebanon as it arguably is the only country which has a confessional governmental system. 
Confessionalism was introduced in Lebanon with the Constitution from 1926 and the 
principle was reconfirmed in the 1943 National Pact and the 1989 Ta’if Agreement (Ta’if 
Agreement and Lebanese Constitution). 
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However, confessionalism is highly influenced and based on the type of democracy referred 
to as consociationalism. Consociationalism is often seen in Western polyarchies where 
pluralism and consensus are vital. The system is often used in countries made up by different 
divided groups, these divisions often religious, ethnic or class contingent. Significant 
characteristic of the system are proportional share of power, cross-communal consensus on 
major policies, communal autonomy and the option of veto power for all larger groups. 
Countries like Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands are examples of this. In 
1917 new electoral rules were introduced in the Netherlands, and the concept behind the term 
consociationalism was created. (Heywood, 2007, p. 33-34, Lijphart, 1975, p. 112-115, United States 
Institute for Peace).  
 
A prolific social scientist who has discussed the principle of consociationalism is the Dutch 
political scientist Arend Lijphart. He distinguished between the Westminster model and the 
Consensus model of democracy. The first being a majority democracy, the latter is more a 
type of democracy in line with consociationalism and confessionalism. Lijphart’s theory and 
concept of democracy will be discussed more thoroughly later in the project so it will not be 
further elaborated here (Lijphart, 1999, p. 1).        
 
Druze 
The Druze is a smaller religious community found primarily in Lebanon, Israel and Syria 
whose traditional religion is said to have begun as an offshoot of the Ismaili sect of Islam. 
The group often describe themselves as “Those who posses knowledge” or “Sons of mercy” 
(Mattar, 2004, vol. 2, p. 726). 
 
Ethnic 
While the term ‘race’ emphasizes biological differences based on skin colour, ethnicity 
denotes the sense of belonging to a particular community whose members share common 
cultural traditions (Bilton et al., 2007, p. 164).  
 
Lebanese Civil War 
The Lebanese Civil War is in many ways a confusing and ambiguous term. Normally, wars 
start and end at certain points in time, but with the Lebanese Civil War these distinctions are 
blurred. In most historical material on Lebanon there is a common agreement that the decisive 
act that started the war took place the 13th of April 1975. On this day gunmen attacked and 
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killed four members of the political Christian Phalange party. The attack was seen as an 
attempt to kill Pierre Gemayel, the leader and the founder of the party, and was retaliated by 
Phalange militia men with an attack on a bus carrying Palestinian passengers, resulting in the 
killings of 27 Palestinians (Picard, 2002,  p. 105). 
 
The ending of the Civil War is somehow more difficult to determine. The war formally ended 
in 1976 with the Riyadh conference and the subsequent Arab League meeting in Cairo where 
the creation of the Arab Deterrent League took place. However, it can also be argued that the 
war first ended in the spring 1991 when the militias on both sides started to disarm and an 
amnesty law was passed that pardoned all political crimes committed during the Civil War 
(Picard, 2002, p. 160-161, US Department of State). 
   
Lebanese constitution - 1926 (23 May) 
Under the French mandate Lebanon’s first Constitution in 1926 stipulated that representation 
in government office would be temporarily on confessional basis (Mattar, 2004, vol 1, p. 411) The 
constitution modelled after the French Third Republic, stresses freedom and equality, 
although with some limitations (Abukhalil, 1998, p. 57). 
 
Maronites 
Lebanese Catholics whose church entered into union with Rome in the 12-th century. Used to 
reside in the mountains of Lebanon, living under a Feudal Structure, like the Druzes further 
south. Because of the support of the also Christian French under the French mandate the 
Maronites where given the main political power, e.g. the presidency (McDowall, 1996, p. 7). 
 
National Pact - 1943 
The National Pact (al Mithaq al Watani), an unwritten agreement, came into being in the 
summer of 1943. It stipulated that Christians would not seek Western protection and that 
Muslims would renounce their dreams of Arab or Syrian unity. The pact also reinforced the 
sectarian system of government begun under the French Mandate by formalizing the 
confessional distribution of high-level posts in the government and in parliament based on the 
1932 census. A six-to-five ratio favouring Christians over Muslims were decided upon in 
parliament while a five-to-five ratio was agreed upon in government and civil service. The 
most important administrative and political positions were to be shared between the six larges 
communities the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni, Shi’a and Druze.  The 
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president should be a Maronite, the speaker a Shi’a, and the Prime Minister a Sunni (Abukhalil, 
1998, p. 161,  Picard, 2002, p. 70). 
 
Shi’a 
Is the largest minority denomination in the world based on the Islamic faith after Sunnis. 
Shi’as follow the teachings of The Prophet Muhammed and the religious guidance of his 
family or his descendants known as Shi'a Imams, whom they consider to be infallible. Shi’a's 
assert the right of Muhammad’s family, beginning with Ali ibn Abi Talib (Muhammad's 
cousin), as successor to Muhammad, rejecting the legitimacy of the first three caliphs) of 
Islamic history (Martin, 2004, p. 621). In Lebanon the Shi’as are found mainly in the south and in 
the Biqa Valley, and also the largest group in Beirut due to urbanization. Traditionally they 
are the poor and exploited group in Lebanon with little political representation given. But now 
also the largest group. 
 
Sunni 
Orthodox Sunni Muslims regard the Qur’an, supplemented by the traditions of the prophet, as 
the sole embodiment of the Muslim faith. The dominating Muslim establishment In Lebanon, 
(not largest though) since it shares religion with the former Ottoman Empire. The Prime 
minister in Lebanon is to be a Sunni (Abukhalil, 1998, p. 205).  
 
Ta’if agreement - 1989 
This treaty, signed in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia in September 1989 formally ended the Lebanese 
Civil War. It was attended by 31 Christian and 31 Muslim deputies out of the 73 surviving 
members of the 1972 parliament. The agreement demanded the disarmament of all militias in 
Lebanon, Syrian evacuation of troops in Lebanon, and also an eventual end to Political 
Sectarianism –though no timetable was given. In 1990 the Lebanese constitution was 
amended to incorporate the reforms of these accords (Abukhalil, 1998, p. 210). 
 
 
